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Mr. Justice Stewart: ". . . that's the First Amendment, what this case is all
about, plus, perhaps, the Fifth Amendment; but we are talking about speech,
money is speech, and speech is money, whether it be buying television or radio
time or newspaper advertising, or even buying pencils and paper and microphones.
"That's the - that's certainly clear, isn't it?"
Mr. Justice Blackmun: ". . . following through on what Justice Stewart indicated, it seems to me, in a distinct sense, that one of [the appellees']
problems is to joust with this suggestion that money is speech. And I think part
of the argument of your opponents is very forceful in that respect, that it does
produce speech."
Comments from the bench during oral argument in Buckley v. Valeo,
Nos. 75-436 and 75-437, on Monday, November 14, 1975; Record at 67,70.

The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo' undoubtedly will be the forerunner of many future decisions dealing with the
complex area of political campaign finance and thus will exert a
profound influence on the structure of American politics. From a
broader perspective, the decision significantly applies fundamental
constitutional law doctrines concerning the first amendment and
separation of powers. Accordingly, a clear understanding of what
the Court did and did not do in Buckley is essential to any further
legislative or judicial initiatives in the regulation of political activity. This article will examine the Court's holdings in Buckley, describe the congressional response thereto, and attempt to analyze
the potential constitutional effects of the decision and the legislation that followed it, with emphasis on issues left unresolved by the
Court.
I.

THE BUCKLEY DECISION

Senator James L. Buckley, former Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, and ten co-plaintiffs2 challenged the constitutionality of major
provisions of existing federal law3 regulating the financing of politiv. Valeo. Also representing the plaintiffs were Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Professor, Yale Law
School, and Melvin L. Wolf and Joel M. Gora of the American Civil Liberties Union.
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. The original plaintiffs, who filed their complaint on January 2, 1975, the first business day after the effective date of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
were Senators Buckley and McCarthy, Representative William A. Steiger, Stewart R. Mott,
the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency (which later added "-McCarthy '76" to its
name), the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the New York Civil Liberties Union,
Inc., the American Conservative Union, and Human Events, Inc. They were joined on February 7 by the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, and the Conservative
Victory Fund.
3. Those statutes were the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-54
(Supp. II, 1972) [hereinafter cited as FECA of 1971], the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in several titles of U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as FECA Amendments of 1974], and Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue
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cal campaigns for federal office.' These provisions included limitations on campaign expenditures, campaign contributions, and socalled independent expenditures (i.e. election-related expenditures
made by private citizens or groups independently of the candidates
and their campaigns); required record-keeping and public disclosure of all the above; federal subsidies to some (but not all) presidential candidates; and the creation of a Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the substantive provisions.
Plaintiffs contended that these laws infringed free speech by
candidates, citizens, and groups and violated equal protection principles by discriminating invidiously among candidates and political
groups, generally (although not invariably) in favor of incumbents
and major parties and against challengers and third-party and independent candidates and their contributors and supporters. The
Commission was also challenged as an "arm of Congress" performing functions reserved to the Executive in violation of constitutional
allocation of powers. The statutes were challenged in toto except for
the disclosure provisions, which plaintiffs attacked only on limited
overbreadth grounds.
A.

The Applicable ConstitutionalRules

In the court of appeals,5 the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges
Code of 1954, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 9001-42. "FECA" is used generally to describe the
FECA of 1971 and all its amendments.
4. The principal provisions not challenged include the following: former 18 U.S.C. § 610
(1970) (contributions or expenditures by national banks, corporations, or labor organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1970) (contributions by government contractors; separate segregated
funds of corporations and labor organizations); 18 U.S.C. § 613 (1970) (contributions by
foreign nationals); 18 U.S.C. § 614 (1970) (prohibition on contributions in the name of another); and 18 U.S.C. § 615 (1970) (limitation on contributions of currency). These provisions,
in some cases with amendments, are now 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441b, 441c, 441e, 441f, 441g (Supp.
3, 1976).
5. 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Buckley case was in fact heard by two courts in
session simultaneously. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en
banc pursuant to the statute's special judicial review provision, 2 U.S.C. § 437h (Supp. IV,
1974), heard argument on all of the challenged provisions. A 3-judge district court (composed
of 2 members of the court of appeals and the district judge to whom the case was first
assigned) also heard the argument and issued a separate decision dealing only with the
challenge to Subtitle H. 401 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975). This curious arrangement was
necessitated because § 437h did not clearly provide that Subtitle H was subject to the same
judicial review procedures as the FECA. Since at least one and perhaps both courts plainly
had jurisdiction over Subtitle H, the Supreme Court did not decide the jurisdiction question.
See 424 U.S. at 9-10 n.6.
For purposes of simplicity - and since the 3-judge district court merely adopted the
court of appeals' holding on Subtitle H in toto, 401 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975) - this article
will refer to both courts below as "the court of appeals."
Aside from the 3-judge court's decision on Subtitle H, no district court ever ruled on the
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were almost wholly rejected. Accepting almost every justification
that had been advanced in Congress and by the original and intervening defendants' in support of the statutes, the per curiam opinion 7 relied on the familiar language of United States v. O'Brien to
uphold the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA):
[A] government regulation [of speech] is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest."

This constitutional test was held satisfied largely on the theory that
corruption and the appearance of corruption - as exemplified by
the supposed example of Watergate9 - required and justified massive congressional intervention in the political process. The court of
appeals thus found a "compelling interest in safeguarding the integrity of elections and avoiding the undue influence of wealth."'" As a
subsidiary justification, the court of appeals accepted defendants'
contentions that appropriate analogies could be drawn from the
reapportionment cases, including Reynolds v. Sims" and Wesberry
v. Sanders, which enunciate the "one man, one vote" formula for
legislative districting. This "equal protection" argument rested on
the idea that the FECA's limitations on the contribution and expenditure of financial resources tended to equalize the power of the
case. Section 437h provides for certification of all constitutional questions to the court of
appeals without decision by the district court. The district court, however, at the direction
of the court of appeals, was involved in formulating issues and making findings of fact on
the basis of an extensive record compiled by the parties and elicited on discovery. 519 F.2d
817, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
6. The original defendants were the Federal Election Commission, the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the Clerk of the House, and Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the
Senate. The federal defendants were joined by 3 of the organizations principally responsible
for having secured congressional passage of the challenged statutes - Common Cause, the
League of Women Voters, and the Center for Public Financing of Elections - and several
individuals associated with those groups.
7. Chief Judge Bazelon and Judges Wilkey, Tamm, and MacKinnon dissented from
various portions of the court's opinion.
8. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
9. Plaintiffs argued that the statutes were not genuinely directed to the abuses of 1972
and that the statutes would make the recurrence of abuse more rather than less likely. Merely
as one example, the incumbent administration, through the Secretary of the Treasury, is
given considerable discretion in determining the amounts of federal subsidies available for
presidential candidates. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9006(c), 9037 (Supp. IV, 1974).
10. 519 F.2d at 841.
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

19761

BUCKLEY v. VALEO

1331

wealthy and the non-wealthy, thus advancing the goal of political
equality. Finally, the court also accepted defendants' argument that
Congress had a valid interest in checking allegedly "skyrocketing"
increases in campaign costs.
While conceding that "strict judicial scrutiny of the challenged
provisions is appropriate,' 3 the court of appeals emphasized the
primacy of the legislative decision, declaring that "[o]n questions
of degree, of drawing the line, sound doctrine gives Congress latitude for reasonable judgments. . ."" No attention was paid to
precedents clearly holding that such deference is unwarranted and
inappropriate when first amendment rights are at issue."l
By contrast, the Supreme Court, also in a per curiam opinion,
declared that the FECA's "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities."' 6 Noting that the "conflicting contentions" of the parties
"could not more sharply define the basic issues before us, ' 17 the
Court rejected O'Brien as the applicable standard:
".

We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in
O'Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card .... [This Court has never suggested
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates
itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment.'"

The Court also rejected other constitutional analogies that had
been developed in defense of the challenged statutes. Professor
Freund's alliterative and often-repeated slogan that if decibels
could be regulated so could dollars 9 was quickly dismissed as based
on "a fundamental misconception.""0
13. 519 F.2d at 843.
14. Id. at 842.
15. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
16. 424 U.S. at 14.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 16.
19. See Freund, Commentary, in ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FiNANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONs 72-73 (1971). Professor Freund's reference was to the
soundtruck cases. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
20. The Buckley Court stated:
The decibel restriction upheld in Kovacs limited the manner of operating a soundtruck,
but not the extent of its proper use. By contrast, the Act's dollar ceilings restrict the
extent of the reasonable use of virtually every means of communicating information.
424 U.S. at 18-19 n.17.
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Despite its concern with protecting first amendment rights, the
Court distinguished between expenditure limits and limits on contributions to campaigns for the purpose of constitutional adjudication. Although holding that the FECA's expenditure limits "represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the
quantity and diversity of political speech,"' the Court concluded
that, "by contrast," a campaign contribution limitation "entails
only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage
in free communication. ' 22 While recognizing that both expenditure
and contribution limits impinge on protected associational freedoms, the Court found the infringement substantially less in the
case of campaign contribution limits. In sum, the FECA's "expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its
limitations on financial contributions."' '
The Court's unfortunate and ultimately inadequate attempt to
distinguish between contribution and expenditure limits lies at the
heart of the continued uncertainty surrounding many of the constitutional issues left unresolved by Buckley and the new issues raised
by the congressional response to the decision.24 Indeed, considerable
doubt exists whether, as experience under the FECA accumulates,
the Court can continue to sustain the distinction it drew in Buckley.
As the Chief Justice said in his separate opinion, "contributions and
expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin." 25 As
will be suggested more fully, practical implementation of the
Court's theoretical distinction seems unworkable, particularly with
respect to "independent expenditures" - those made by individuals and groups not under the control of or in coordination with
particular candidates.
B.

Limitations on Expenditures

Pursuant to the theoretical framework described above, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional limitations on candidate
expenditures, 2 limitations on expenditures by candidates from their
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id. at 20-21.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475 [hereinafter cited as FECA Amendments of 1976].
25. 424 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
26. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976).
Candidates for a party's nomination for President could not spend over $10,000,000 in pursuit
of that nomination; the total spent in any one state could not exceed twice the expenditure
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personal resources, 27 and limitations on independent expenditures.2 1
The Court explicitly rejected the reasoning of the court of appeals
that there was a compelling governmental interest in equalizing the
financial resources of candidates.2 9 The Court also emphatically rejected the rationale that election costs had grown too high and the
costs of politics should be reduced:
The First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free
society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government but the people
- individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and
political committees - who must retain control over the quantity and range
of debate on public issues in a political campaign.3'

Similar reasoning led to the holding that 18 U.S.C. § 608(e), the
limit on independent expenditures, was unconstitutional. Because
the plaintiffs had also challenged section 608(e) on vagueness
grounds, however, the Court attempted to construe the language of
section 608(e) in order to eliminate the vagueness it found before
striking the section down as unconstitutional per se. It restricted the
application of the provision "to communications containing express
words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,'
'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
'defeat,' 'reject.' ",31 Thus communications that omit these "buzz
words" (what we call "independent non-expenditures") would not
be restricted under section 608(e), and in fact could not be re32
strained constitutionally.
limit applicable in that state to a candidate for nomination for election to the Senate.

General-election candidates for the presidency were limited to $20,000,000.
Candidates for nomination for election to the Senate were limited to spending 8 cents
multiplied by the state's voting age population or $100,000, whichever was greater. No
general-election Senate candidate was permitted to spend in excess of 12 cents multiplied by
the state's voting age population or $150,000, whichever was greater.
In states with only one member in the House of Representatives, the Senate spending
limits applied. In all other House elections, no candidate was allowed to spend in excess of
$70,000 in pursuit of the nomination or in excess of $70,000 in the general election.
Candidates were permitted to spend an additional 20% of the applicable limit for fundraising purposes, 18 U.S.C. § 591(f)(4)(H) (Supp. IV, 1974), and the limits themselves were
to be adjusted to changes in the Consumer Price Index, id. § 608(d).
27. Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203,86 Stat. 9 (repealed 1976). Candidates
were limited to spending their personal funds or the funds of their immediate families as
follows: $50,000 in the case of a candidate for President, $35,000 in the case of a candidate
for the Senate, and $25,000 in the case of a candidate for the House.
28. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976).
No person (defined by 18 U.S.C. § 591(g) (Supp. IV, 1974) to include individuals, committees,
and groups) could spend in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year "relative to a clearly
identified candidate" and "advocating the election or defeat of such candidate."
29. 424 U.S. at 56-57.
30. Id. at 57.
31. Id. at 44 n.52.
32. Also of considerable importance is the Court's holding that independent expendi-
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Other alleged interests justifying section 608(e) were also unsuccessful: the notion that a limit on independent expenditures was
necessary to close the "loophole" that existed between contribution
and expenditure limits," the argument that restrictions such as
those embodied in the Hatch Act also justified the FECA restrictions, 34 and the analogy to5 the "fairness doctrine" under Red Lion
3
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.
Perhaps the most significant constitutional clash in Buckley
was between the concepts of egalitarianism and the first amendment. The statute's defenders had argued that restraining large
spenders and contributors made all citizens more equal politically,
and that such equalization represented a compelling governmental
interest sufficient to justify the FECA's limitations. In language
that admits of only one interpretation - that the first amendment
is paramount when measured against equal protection arguments the Court stated:
[Tihe concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment. . . 36

Finding no rational relationship between limits on expenditures
by candidates from their own personal funds and the only legitimate
governmental interest served by the FECA, the elimination of corruption," the Court held such limits to be unconstitutional. Particutures do not appear "to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those
identified with large campaign contributions." Id. at 46.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 48 n.54.
35. 395 U.S. 367 (1969); see 424 U.S. at 49-50 n.55. The analogies listed in the text were
often used, and indeed were argued in Buckley, in conjunction with Professor Freund's alliteration. See note 19 supra.
36. 424 U.S. at 48-49.
37. The Court apparently rejected the view of the court of appeals, 519 F.2d at 854, and
the Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion 1975-65, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,393 (1975), that
any member of the candidate's immediate family was permitted to contribute to the candidate's campaign amounts in excess of the $1,000 limitation on individual contributions, Act
of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976) (up to the $25,000
aggregate candidate year contribution ceiling). 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(a)(3) (Supp. 3, 1976). Without explicitly holding to the contrary, the Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals and
the FEC had overlooked pertinent Conference Committee report language:
[Miembers of the immediate family of any candidate shall be subject to the contribution limitations established by this legislation. If a candidate for the office of Senator,
for example, already is in a position to exercise control over funds of a member of his
immediate family before he becomes a candidate, then he could draw upon these funds
up to the limit of $35,000. If, however, the candidate did not have access to or control
over such funds at the time he became a candidate, the immediate family member would
not be permitted to grant access or control to the candidate in amounts up to $35,000,
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larly when personal wealth is directly related to effective candidacy,
the Supreme Court's sharp dismissal of the equal protection arguments raised emphasizes the primacy of first amendment values in
3
the campaign finance field. 1
An argument plaintiffs decided against making in Buckley, in
part on the ground that it sounded too political, is that restrictions
on campaign financing generally favor Democrats over Republicans
because the latter need to exploit their generally greater access to
substantial contributors or larger total contributions to overcome
the Democrats' much larger registered membership. Moreover, it
can be argued persuasively that so long as our social system is based
on the premise that inequalities of wealth serve valid and useful
purposes, the wealthy need means to exercise their financial power
to defend themselves politically against the greater numbers who
may believe that their economic interests militate toward leveling. 39
As long as that financial power is exercised through speech or financing the speech of others, rather than through conduct such as
if the immediate family member intends that such amounts are to be used in the
campaign of the candidate. The immediate family member would be permitted merely
to make contributions to the candidate in amounts not greater than $1,000 for each
election involved.
424 U.S. at 52 n.57, quoting from S. REP. No. 1237, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1974).
The Court did not define "access to" or "control over;" thus the reach of its decision in
this area is still somewhat unclear. If, moreover, the donor family member did not possess
the requisite intent, a gift to the relative-candidate would still not be subject to any limitations. The Commission adopted the Supreme Court's view in a Policy Statement, 41 Fed.
Reg. 44131 (1976).
38. Justice Marshall dissented from the portion of the per curiam opinion declaring
limits on a candidate's expenditures from his personal resources unconstitutional. 424 U.S.
at 286-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He reasoned, correctly in our view, that wealthy candidates would begin their campaigns with a significant "head start" over their less affluent
opponents, and that:
[Ijarge contributions are the less wealthy candidate's only hope of countering the
wealthy candidate's immediate access to substantial sums of money. With that option
removed, the less wealthy candidate is without the means to match the large initial
expenditures of money of which the wealthy candidate is capable.
Id. at 289. Justice Marshall's pragmatic reasoning demonstrates the impossibility of maintaining a constitutional distinction between expenditures and contributions. Nevertheless, he
would have upheld contribution limits even while concurring in voiding limits on the total
amounts candidates and independent individuals and groups could spend. The more consistent course, and in particular the more consistent course for those concerned about the fate
of non-affluent candidates, would have been to vote to invalidate the limits on contributions
to candidates.
39. The same Congress which enacted the FECA Amendments of 1976 also enacted
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which imposes taxes totaling over 84% in the highest
bracket on the "appreciated" value (usually due mostly to inflation) of inherited property
which is sold (701 estate tax, then 47'z2% income tax on the 30% remaining. State taxes, of
course, will make the totals even higher. Any distinction between such tax brackets and
confiscation of property without compensation seems illusory.
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bribery, it would appear entitled to first amendment protection.
The Court again appeared implicitly to endorse such considerations
when applied to expenditure limits, but not when applied to contribution limits.
Plaintiffs further argued that campaign regulation is bound to
discriminate, and that the FECA did discriminate, generally in
favor of incumbents and against challengers and third-party and
independent candidates. The Court generally was receptive to these
arguments but believed they would justify only more-than-facial
challenges.
Having voided expenditure limits early in its opinion, the Court
later and almost without explanation upheld such limits when accompanied by federal subsidies to candidates." The Court made no
attempt to reconcile that result with the unconstitutional-condition
doctrine.' The spectacle of government's demanding that a candidate restrict, in return for federal payments, what the Court itself
has squarely held to be his first amendment right to speech would
seem to present one of the strongest cases imaginable for application
of the unconstitutional-condition doctrine. Further, the case is
strengthened by at least two considerations that as a practical matter will coerce the candidate into accepting subsidies whenever offered and thus into accepting "voluntary" limits on his speech.
First, his subsidy-accepting opponent is relieved of some, or in general elections, all the burdens and uncertainties involved in political
fund raising. Secondly, contribution limits intensify the competitive
disadvantages by making private fundraising far more onerous than
ever before.
In short, the candidate is presented with a particularly
invidious form of the twentieth century "Catch 22" which threatens
to reduce the private sector to adjuncts and servants of the state:
government imposes restrictions upon, and by taxation or otherwise
dries up funds formerly available to, a private activity; government
then offers public funds to subsidize the activity it itself has
40.

424 U.S. at 107-08. The practical effect under present conditions is to void expendi-

ture limits as applied to congressional elections but to preserve them for presidential elections. The aggregate limitation on presidential campaign expenditures is now codified as 2
U.S.C.A. § 441a(b) (Supp. 3, 1976). The FECA Amendments of 1976 also reimposed the
$50,000 limit on expenditures from personal funds for presidential candidates accepting federal subsidies, for both candidates for nomination and general-election candidates. 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 9035(a), 9004(d), (Supp. 3, 1976).
41. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968). No party suggested to the Court the possibility of upholding expenditure
limits only as to subsidized candidates. The unconstitutional condition problem was never
discussed in briefs, oral argument, or opinion.
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crippled; the courts then hold that by virtue of the regulation and
the subsidies the formerly private activity has become "state action" and thus subject to even greater governmental control.12 When
this process involves a virtually coerced surrender of first amendment rights in an area going to the heart of the political process, it
is difficult to see how the Court's unexplained result can be sus3
tained if the issue is brought before it and fully analyzed.1
Another curious aspect of the decision is that the Court did not
invalidate limitations on what political parties could spend on behalf of their nominees.44 Although the plaintiffs made both a first
and a fifth amendment challenge to these provisions, arguing that
by allowing spending by parties in addition to what candidates
could spend, the FECA discriminated against independent candidates not supported by party committees, the Court answered only
the fifth amendment challenge by noting that since the candidateand independent-expenditure limitations had been voided, the
predicate for the discrimination argument had been eliminated. "
While correct as far as it went, the Court's discussion simply ignored
the first amendment arguments. The conclusion seems unavoidable
that a political party challenging the limitation on first amendment
grounds in a new lawsuit would succeed. Only the Democratic and
Republican parties will have much incentive to make such a challenge (and their incentive may easily be counterbalanced by other
42. See note 60 infra. One of many obvious examples is the process by which federal
control has taken over both the admissions and hiring policies of once-private colleges and
universitites in the name of "affirmative action." The process has now been extended, without benefit of statute, to private secondary schools under threat of loss of their charitable
status for income-tax purposes. See Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 49, at 46-49.
43. It might be argued that only major-party presidential candidates would have standing to raise the issue. Voters, however, could reasonably argue that the unconstitutional
condition adversely affects them by drastically reducing the level of campaigning and thus
denying them information they need to cast their ballot intelligently. Press reports indicate
that those effects are being felt with a vengeance in the 1976 presidential campaign. See, e.g.,
Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 1. The Buckley Amendment, now 2 U.S.C.A. §
437h (Supp. 3, 1976), purports to give any voter standing to challenge the constitutionality
of any provision of the FECA. While Article III constitutional limits on standing remain, the
Buckley Court found that "at least some of the appellants [had] a sufficient 'personal
stake'" as to each constitutional issue raised, which of course included the expenditure
limits. 424 U.S. at 12.
44. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976) (now
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(d) (Supp. 3, 1976)). A political party's national committee is limited to
spending 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States in the presidential general election. A national or state party committee may also spend up to 2 cents
multiplied by the voting age population of the state or $20,000, whichever is greater, in an
election to the office of Senator or at-large Representative. Such committees may also spend
up to $10,000 in an election to the office of Representative.
45. 424 U.S. at 58 n.66, 59-60 n.67.
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considerations) as long as only they are receiving federal subsidies
for their presidential candidates. The limitation relating to other
parties and non-presidential elections is fairly academic since unlimited expenditures may be made by the candidates themselves.
C.

Limitations on Contributionsto Candidates

As previously noted, the Supreme Court's constitutional distinction between campaign contributions and expenditures allowed
the Court to uphold the FECA's limits on contributions to candidates for federal office: $1,000 per person per candidate per election, 6 $5,000 per candidate per election for certain specially defined
political committees," and an aggregate annual limit for individuals
of $25,000.8 The Court expressly declined to rest its validation of
these limits on any ground other than the alleged need to eliminate
corruption and the appearance of corruption.49
Moreover, the Court rejected only the plaintiffs' facial attack,
thus permitting future challenges directly against the contribution
limitations if they are proved to be discriminatory in practice."
Combined with the other difficulties created by the Court's decision, such as the existence of separate constitutional rules for expenditures and contributions, the discrimination in favor of personally wealthy candidates, and the murky line between truly independent expenditures and expenditures deemed subject to the control
of the candidate, the possibility of subsequent direct challenges to
the contribution limits may bode poorly for their ultimate chances
of survival.
46. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976) (now
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 3, 1976)). "Person" is defined broadly to include an
"individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, and any
other organization or group of persons." "Election" is defined to mean a general, special,
primary, or runoff election. 2 U.S.C. § 431(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). The effect of the definition is
to permit a person to contribute $1,000 to a candidate for a primary election and another
$1,000 for his general election.
47. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976) (now
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 3, 1976)). These so-called "multi-candidate" committees
must meet the following criteria before they are allowed to make contributions up to $5,000:
they must be registered under 2 U.S.C. § 433 (Supp. IV, 1974) for not less than 6 months;
they must have received contributions from more than 50 persons; and they must have made
contributions to 5 or more candidates for federal office. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(4) (Supp.
3, 1976).
48. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976) (now
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(3) (Supp. 3, 1976)).
49. 424 U.S. at 26.
50. Id. at 33-34.
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Disclosure of Campaign Contributions

The Buckley plaintiffs argued that the FECA's disclosure provisions' discriminated against certain third parties and independent candidates, and that the dollar amounts contained in the
"threshold" provisions triggering the reporting and disclosure requirements were too low. The plaintiffs did not challenge disclosure
requirements in principle. Indeed, it was one of their main contentions that narrowly drafted disclosure statutes were the best remedy
for virtually every evil Congress sought to cure in the FECA. Plaintiffs argued rather that the threshold amounts for disclosure are
unnecessarily low and that application of the requirements to
minor-party and independent candidates and their contributors,
who may be subject to harassment if their contributions are publicly
revealed, serve no compelling interest sufficient to override the associational rights at stake. Although only the Chief Justice agreed
that the thresholds were too low,52 the per curiam opinion agreed
with the plaintiffs' other major argument that there might be cases
"where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so
serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial" that the FECA's requirements could not be imposed constitutionally. 3 Although none of the Buckley plaintiffs was deemed to
have made the requisite showing, the Court established specific
rules on how to do so, including a direction that requirements as to
the necessary proof not be overly strict. 4 This judicially created
exemption from the disclosure requirements has not yet been applied by the federal courts, but the opportunity will soon arise.5"
51. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-36 (Supp. III, 1973). Political committees, as defined by 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(d) are required to keep detailed records of the identities of all individuals who contribute more than $10 to them, subject to audit by the FEC. Id. §§ 432(b)-(d), 438(a)-(d).
Political committees and candidates were further required to file periodic reports disclosing
the names, occupations, and principal places of business of those contributing in excess of
$100. Id. § 434(b)(l)-(8). Certain resources available to incumbent officeholders, enumerated
in § 434(d), are not, however, required to be disclosed.
52. The Court expressly preserved the possibility that the thresholds might be successfully challenged at some later date after experience under the Act has been accumulated. In
fact, the Court agreed that "[these strict requirements may well discourage participation
by some citizens in the political process . . . ." 424 U.S. at 83.
Specifically concerning the requirement that records be kept of all contributions in excess
of $10, subject to audit by the Federal Elections Commission, the Court reserved judgment
whether those records could be made publicly available without violating the contributors'
first amendment rights.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id. at 74.
55. Socialist Workers Party v. Jennings, Civil No. 74-1338 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 10, 1974)
may well be the first decision to apply the Buckley disclosure standards.
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Also significant in the disclosure area was the Court's treatment of 2 U.S.C. § 434(e), the section providing for disclosure of
independent expenditures." As with independent expenditures
themselves, the Court first construed section 434(e) to apply only
to those communications containing express words of advocacy. 7
The Court then found that the disclosure requirement did not con58 and upheld its constitutionality.
flict with Talley v. California,
This interpretation aligned section 434(e) with the decision of the
court of appeals invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 437a, a section that would
have required disclosure of contributions to and expenditures by
such groups as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Conservative Union if made "for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of an election." Since there was general agreement that the
section was unconstitutional, none of the defendants appealed the
lower court's decision. Thus, following Buckley, not only are unlimited independent expenditures now permissible; if communications
financed by such expenditures do not contain the "buzz words" of
the Court's footnote 52, the expenditures need not even be reported.
E.

Federal Subsidies

In upholding the challenged provisions of Subtitle H of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which provides federal subsidies to
presidential candidates, the Supreme Court stressed the "positive"
aspects of the legislation:
Subtitle H is a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech,
but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people."

Only Chief Justice Burger accepted the plaintiffs' analogy between
funding political parties and candidates and the governmental
funding of religious organizations; the per curiam opinion held that
concern over federal funding's leading to control over political parties was "wholly speculative." 6
56. As originally written, § 434(e) provided that every person who contributes or expends more than $100 per year other than by contribution to a political committee or candidate must file a report with the Federal Election Commission disclosing the same information
required of political committees and candidates.
57. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
58. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
59. 424 U.S. at 92-93. The Court made no attempt to reconcile this rationale with its
holding that candidates accepting subsidies may be subjected to expenditure limits. See notes
40-43 supra and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 93 n.126. That this was an overstatement was demonstrated soon afterward
in Advocates for Arts v. Thompson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976). Quoting the passage from
Buckley repeated in the text accompanying note 59 supra, the court of appeals upheld a
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Moreover, the Court rejected the numerous specific claims of
discrimination against independent and third-party presidential
candidates raised by the plaintiffs.6 ' Basing its decision largely on
the logic of the ballot access cases, 2 the Court observed that it was
rejecting only the facial challenge to Subtitle H. The Court expressed its willingness "upon an appropriate factual demonstration" to entertain future claims of invidious discrimination after the
subsidy system had been observed in operation. 3
Assisted by the Buckley Court's reliance on a theory that subsidy discrimination in favor of major-party candidates is at least to
some extent offset by the "countervailing denial" 4 to candidates
accepting subsidies of the right to spend in excess of expenditure
ceilings, independent and third-party candidates presumably will
soon challenge the subsidy system as discriminatory in its
operation. The "countervailing denial" theory seems unlikely for
two reasons to withstand litigation based on actual experience
under the Act. First, especially given contribution limits, the expenditure ceilings are far higher than the amounts all but the rarest
third-party or independent candidates can raise. Indeed, contrary
to the Court's assumption,65 experience seems likely to show that
such candidates will be able to raise and spend less in proportion
to major-party candidates than in the past. Secondly, if (as seems
likely) expenditures made on behalf of candidates accepting subsidies rapidly come to include large amounts of independent expenditures in addition to their limited authorized spending, the spending
limits may have relatively little effect on the total amount of activity on behalf of major-party candidates and correspondingly little
effectiveness in somehow compensating other candidates for the
denial of subsidies to them.
decision by the Governor and Executive Council of New Hampshire to deny a grant from the
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities to a literary journal because of an
allegedly obscene poem that appeared therein. While noting the long-standing policy of
governmental noninterference with expression in "public places," the court declared that
"there is no similar tradition of absolute neutrality in public subsidization of activities involving speech." 532 F.2d at 796.
Even prior to the Buckley decision, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 575-76 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976), strongly intimated that receipt of federal subsidies
by the major parties transformed their activities into "state action" subject to the fifth
amendment.
61. 424 U.S. at 93-97.
62. See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
63. 424 U.S. at 97 n.131.
64. Id. at 95.
65. Id. at 99.
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The Federal Election Commission

Although the appointment power of Article II, section 2 of the
Constitution 6 is one of the most important prerogatives in the federal government, prior to Buckley the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the issue of the extent to which Congress could
participate with the executive branch in the choice of officers of the
United States." After a scholarly review of the debates of the Constitutional Convention and case law interpreting the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court held that the Federal Election Commission as then constituted" could not exercise rule-making or enforcement powers. 9 Only duties related to the flow of information
- "receipt, dissemination and investigation" - that could be carried out by a committee of the Congress were permitted.
The appointment issue, while generally treated by the Court as
a discrete question involving only separation of powers, was in
practical substance intimately linked, in plaintiffs' view, with the
paramount dangers inherent in intensive governmental regulation
of campaign finance generally. Congressmen are not only legislators
but also politicians who usually plan to campaign for re-election. A
principal spectre raised by legislative tampering with the political
process is the danger that the law will be rigged to favor incumbents
over challengers or the congressional majority over the minority.
The problem is made much worse when incumbent congressmen
arrogate to themselves the power to appoint the Commissioners who
will do the detailed regulating. Appointment and confirmation by
the constitutionally ordained process at least ensures the checks and
balances involved when agreement between two separate branches
66. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 states:
[Hle [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
67. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), had involved a construction of
the Organic Act structuring the government of the Philippines. Although foreshadowing the
result in Buckley, Springer alone could not have been dispositive.
68. The original mode of appointment of the 6 voting members of the Commission was
as follows: 2 appointed by the President; 2 appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate (to be recommended by the Senate majority and minority leaders); and 2 appointed
by the Speaker of the House (to be recommended by the House majority and minority
leaders). All 6 were to be confirmed by both the House and Senate. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-443, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1280, as amended 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c (Supp. 3, 1976). The
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House serve ex officio as non-voting members.
69. 424 U.S. at 137-41.
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of government is required. The Court implicitly gave some weight
to these considerations by holding that plaintiffs had standing to
raise the separation of powers issue.70
Although the effect of the Supreme Court's holding was to strip
the FEC of most of its important powers until it was later reconstituted by the Congress, the appointment question was not the only
constitutional issue raised by the plaintiffs. Also attacked were the
chilling effect of the Commission's regulatory powers on speech and
the legislative veto of Commission regulations as violative of the
separation of powers principle and its potentiality for incumbent
control of campaign-finance regulation. The Supreme Court found
it unnecessary to reach these issues in view of its invalidation of the
Commission's powers on the independent ground of congressional
appointment. Although these and many other arguments are not yet
resolved, they emphasize the highly uncertain future of the Commission and the entire regulatory scheme.7'
The thrust of the Court's decision in Buckley indicates that
Congress blundered badly when it passed the FECA Amendments
of 1974. Coupled with the experience of the original FECA of 1971,
key sections of which were held unconstitutional in ACLU v.
Jennings,72 Congress's record in enacting legislation governing the
political process has not been encouraging. Although the Buckley
decision presented Congress with an opportunity to learn from its
past mistakes, the FECA Amendments of 1976 do nothing to resolve, and in several instances exacerbate, problems left undecided
by the Court, which promise a rich harvest of litigation for years to
come.
The 1976 amending process suggests that once campaign finance becomes a heavily regulated and subsidized industry, politicians will be unable to resist continual tinkering with the rules for
partisan political advantage. The best example is perhaps the
lengthy debate and maneuvering, which long delayed enactment of
the 1976 amendments, on whether the financial activity of corporations or labor unions would be more severely restricted. The major70. Id. at 117-18.
71. As one commentator has noted, the overall result of the Court's analysis is that
"although there is little likelihood that, in the near term, legislative provisions of the
type that have been stricken in Buckley will on further consideration be held valid, it is
quite probable that some of the clauses that have been upheld will later be declared
unconstitutional at least in some of their applications."
Rosenthal, The Constitution and Campaign FinanceRegulations after Buckley v. Valeo, 145
ANNALS 124, 133 (1976).
72. 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated as moot sub nom., Staats v. ACLU, 422
U.S. 1030 (1975).
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ity, of course, imposed its will and its interest in the end. The
enacted provisions,7 3 which impose far more severe restrictions on
corporations than on unions, raise questions of discrimination 74 beyond the still-outstanding question of their basic constitutionality."
At least since the Alien and Sedition Acts, political rivalry in
this country generally has taken forms other than legislative attempts to stifle the speech of political opponents. Indications are
that until the Supreme Court more narrowly restricts the sphere of
political-spending regulation, the future will be profoundly different
in that respect.

II.

THE

FEC

RECONSTITUTED

The renascent Federal Election Commission presents two basic
constitutional questions that will require future Supreme Court determination: 71 whether the Congress may retain a "legislative veto"
over the actions of executive or independent agencies, and whether
the FEC has been vested with an impermissible amount of power
and discretion in its interpretation and enforcement of federal election law.77 These questions were raised in Buckley, but the Court
73. Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203, 86 Stat. 9 (repealed 1976) (now 2
U.S.C.A. §§ 441b, 441c (Supp. 3, 1976)).
74. The discrimination argument would be based on the fact that § 441b permits a labor
union the unrestricted rights to propagandize its members and to solicit political contributions from them, but limits the corresponding rights of corporations, with one exception (§
441b(4)(B)), to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families.
75. See text accompanying notes 178-98 infra.
76. The Buckley holding on the appointment issue was satisfied by a simple amendment to 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a), vesting the appointment of all 6 voting members of the Commission in the President. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a) (Supp. 3, 1976).
77. Another issue raised in Buckley, but not resolved, was the power of the FEC to
disqualify individuals from becoming candidates for federal office if it found that those
individuals failed to file a required disclosure report while candidates. The period of disqualification extended from the date of the FEC finding until 1 year after the expiration of the
term of the federal office for which the individual was a candidate. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 92-225, § 407, 88 Stat. 1290 (repealed 1976).
No party to the Buckley litigation, not even the FEC, attempted to defend the provision.
Although the court of appeals agreed that it raised "very serious constitutional questions,"
it did not decide the issue of § 456's constitutionality because of lack of ripeness. 519 F.2d at
892-93. The Supreme Court appears to have condemned § 456 tacitly when it wrote, citing
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), that
[tihe power of each House to judge whether one claiming election . . . has met the
requisite qualifications . . . cannot reasonably be translated into a power granted to the
Congress itself to impose substantive qualifications on the right to so hold such office.
424 U.S. at 133.
In one of the few improvements to the statute made by the FECA Amendments of 1976,
Congress repealed § 456. Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 111, 90 Stat. 486. See
note 24 supra.
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found decision unnecessary since it invalidated the Commission's
powers on the congressional-appointment ground.
A.

The Legislative Veto

Under the FECA Amendments of 1974, the FEC was given
power to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the FECA. 78
Rules or regulations relating to House candidates and political committees are transmitted to the House; rules and regulations relating
to Senate candidates and their committees are transmitted to the
Senate; and rules and regulations relating to elections for both
Houses, to presidential candidates, and to their committees go to
both Houses. If the appropriate body does not disapprove the proposed rule or regulation within thirty legislative days, then the
Commission may prescribe it. 71 These provisions have been challenged in a subsequent suit"0 that should soon confront the Supreme
Court with the same arguments it avoided deciding in Buckley.
The "legislative veto," as such provisions are known, comes in
several different forms." In the FECA's case, it is a "one-House
negative" veto; that is, either House acting independently may veto
the regulation by explicitly voting against the proposed FEC regulations.12 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley, the FEC
78. 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(a)(10) (Supp. 3, 1976). Prior to the FECA Amendments of 1976,
it was possible to argue that the legislative-veto provision applied only to rules and regulations governing reporting and disclosure. The FEC had no rule-making power with respect
to statutory provisions in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(10) (Supp.
IV, 1974), with Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1280, as amended
2 U.S.C.A. § 437d(a) (Supp. 3, 1976). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 282-83 n.27
(White, J., concurring & dissenting). The 1976 Amendments eliminated this potential confusion by moving all provisions of Title 18 over which the Commission had jurisdiction into
Title 2. Even so, the wording of 2 U.S.C. § 438(c), which imposes the legislative veto, still
refers to rules and regulations "dealing with reports or statements required to be filed under
this subchapter." 2 U.S.C. § 438(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). Following the example of the FEC,
which has submitted all its rules to Congress, we assume that that phrase in fact means all
rules or regulations, whether they deal with limits provisions, disclosure provisions, or - as
is usually the case - some combination of the two. Subtitle H contains its own provisions
for the legislative veto. INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 9009(c), 9039(c).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 438(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
80. Clark v. Valeo, Civil No. 76-1227 (D.D.C., filed July 1, 1976). The original plaintiff,
Ramsey Clark, candidate for the Democratic nomination for the U.S. Senate from New York,
has been joined by the United States as intervening plaintiff. The case was certified to the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which (sitting together with a 3-judge district court
considering the Subtitle H aspects, as in Buckley) heard oral argument on September 10,
1976.
81. For an exhaustive description of the various types of legislative veto see Watson,
Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983
(1975).
82. Representative Hays proposed that the legislative veto provision be rewritten after
Buckley to give Congress a line-item veto, rather than the all-or-nothing veto it then pos-
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had sent two sets of proposed regulations to Congress; both were
3
vetoed in October 1975.1
The Buckley plaintiffs' attack on the congressional veto was
twofold: first, they argued that the veto was an unconstitutional
violation of the separation of powers, an argument similar to that
which could be made against virtually all of the legislative vetoes
now embodied in federal statutes; secondly, they argued that the
veto in this case exemplified the particularly offensive nature of the
incumbent-protection features that pervaded the entire FECA. The
Supreme Court decided neither of these contentions, stating in a
footnote that because it held that "the manner of appointment of
members of the Commission precludes them from exercising . . .
rule-making powers . . . ," it would not address this challenge. 4
Only Justice White reached the issue: he would have declared the
85
veto constitutional.
Although the legislative veto has been included in an increasing
number of legislative enactments since the Reorganization Act of
1939,11 it had apparently never been challenged in court prior to
Buckley. Analysis of the legislative veto clearly indicates that it is
in serious constitutional jeopardy. If Commission rules are regarded
as legislative in nature, the veto constitutes what is in effect legislasessed. See H.R. 12406, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 110(b)(1) (1976). This suggestion would have
given Congress a far more powerful veto power than that possessed by the President. The
Senate, however, insisted on retaining the present provision, and the Hays suggestion was
deleted by the Conference Committee. The committee's report, however, explains its action
as follows:
This provision is intended to permit disapproval of discrete self-contained sections or
subdivisions of proposed regulations and is not intended to permit the rewriting of
regulations by piecemeal changes.
H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976). Representative Hays may thus have won
more than he lost on this point.
83. The Senate, on the advice of its Committee on Rules and Administration, S. REP.
No. 409, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), vetoed a set of rules that would have included some
"office account" spending by Members of Congress under the contribution and expenditure
limitations then in Title 18. 121 CONG. REC. 17,888 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975). The House, on
the advice of its Committee on House Administration, H.R. REP. No. 552, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975), vetoed a set of regulations that would have required political candidates, including Members of Congress, to file their campaign financial reports with the FEC rather than
with the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House as the case might be. 121 CONG.
REC. 10,197 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975). For contemporaneous and enlightening accounts of the
politics of the two vetoes see Weaver, Senate Rejects Slush Fund Curb, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9,
1975, at 15, col. 1; Weaver, Election Agency Set Back in House, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1975,
at 1, col. 4.
84. 424 U.S. at 140 n.176.
85. Id. at 282-86 (White, J., concurring & dissenting).
86. See Ginnane, The Control of FederalAdministration by CongressionalResolutions
and Committees, 66 HARv. L. REV. 569, 575-92 (1953).
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tion by Congress without the constitutionally required presidential
participation in the legislative process through the exercise of his
veto power. If, as the Buckley Court strongly suggested in its discussion of the method of appointing the commissioners, the rulemaking function is executive, then the veto is an impermissible
intrusion upon executive-or-independent agency authority. The
Act's provision for a veto by either House acting alone is even more
questionable than the more usual device of a concurrent resolution."
At the Constitutional Convention, the President's veto power
was carefully considered and several alternative suggestions were
debated." The often-quoted language of James Madison emphasizes that Article I, section 7 of the Constitution 9 was drafted expressly to prevent the possibility that the President's veto could be
made meaningless:
[Since] if the negative of the President were confined to bills, it would be
evaded by acts under the form and name of resolutions, votes, etc., [it is]
proposed that 'or resolve' should be added after 'bill', in the beginning of
Section 13, with an exception as to votes of adjournment ....

1

The primary purpose of the executive veto is to allow the President to resist encroachment upon his powers by the Congress. While
Congress of course exercises considerable influence over executive
actions by means of committee oversight and the like, the tensions
between the two branches generally are worked out through a pattern of political accommodation. Nonetheless, the executive was
deemed by the Constitutional Convention to require the defense of
participation in the legislative process itself. As Hamilton wrote in
The Federalist:
The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights,
and to absorb the powers, of the other departments has been already suggested
87. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
88. In many respects, the history of the veto parallels that of the appointment power.
See 424 U.S. at 125-31. Only South Carolina vested its executive with a veto power at the
time of the Constitutional Convention, Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789,
40 J. HOPKINS UNIV. STUDIES INHIST. & POL. Sci. 415, 449-68 (1922), but the subject was widely
debated. Many opponents of a proposed Massachusetts constitution (which was not ratified)
stressed the absence of an executive veto as one basis for their position. Id. at 49-60.
89. That section provides that:
[elvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall
be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take
Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
90. 5 ELLOTr's DEBATES 431 (1845), as quoted in Ginnane, supra note 86, at 573.

1348

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1327

and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing
each with constitutional arms for its own defense, has been inferred and
proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a
negative, either absolute or qualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the
legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations of the latter. He
might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or
annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative
and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands.
If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body to invade
the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety
would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not be left to the mercy of
the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of selfdefense."

Even supporters of the legislative veto concede "that the veto
conceivably could be used to deliver the executive completely or
substantially into the hands of Congress. ' 2 Neither the presidential
veto power nor the President's "great influence over decisions in the
legislative process" 3 would be sufficient to preclude such a result.
As the legislative veto becomes more commonplace, only the judiciary can prevent the usurpation of executive powers. In many respects, the encroachment on executive prerogatives caused by the
veto would be similar to that caused by congressional interference
with the appointment power, which was precluded by the Supreme
Court in Buckley. There seems to be little difference between congressional control over an agency through appointment of its members and control through veto of its regulations. Indeed, since
agency members serve for fixed terms of considerable length, the
latter type of control is undoubtedly much more effective.
Justice White, in his separate opinion in Buckley, agreed that
the main purpose of the executive veto was to "shore up the Executive Branch and to provide it with some bargaining and survival
power against what the Framers feared would be the overweening
power of legislators."" Nonetheless, he argued that
for a regulation to become effective, neither House need approve it, pass it, or
take any action at all with respect to it. The regulation becomes effective by
nonaction. This no more invades the President's powers than does a regulation
not required to be laid before Congress.9'
91.
92.
467, 505
93.
94.
95.

No. 73, at 494-95 (Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Hamilton).
Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution,30 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
THE FEDERALIST

(1962).
Id. at 505-06.
424 U.S. at 285 (White, J., concurring & dissenting).
Id. at 284.
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Justice White's approval of the legislative veto turns on the distinction between affirmative action by Congress to adopt a particular
set of regulations and affirmative action to reject them: "[iut would
be considerably different if Congress itself purported to adopt and
propound regulations by the action of both Houses."9 6 It seems,
however, that such a distinction is without constitutional significance.
By retaining a veto power over whatever regulations the FEC
develops, Congress has simply added one more step to the lawmaking process. Resort to the disapproval method rather than some
other device is simply a pragmatic method of avoiding further
additions to Congress's already crowded schedule. Once the congressional intent is made clear - and the vetoes of the first two sets
of regulations sent to Congress by the FEC speak with particular
clarity - it is far more convenient for Congress to have to act only
on occasions when the Commission resumes its "errant" ways. Even
if such an arrangement is more convenient for Congress, no reason
appears why such an accommodation should rise to the level of a
constitutional distinction. The technique seems an example of what
Madison described as the power of the legislature to "mask under
complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
makes on the coordinate departments."" The constitutionality of
the congressional veto ought not to turn on so immaterial a point.
Like many other supporters of the legislative veto, Justice
White emphasized the President's approval of the enabling legislation creating the disapproval procedure or a congressional override
of his veto. 8 Commentators have similarly argued:
The fact that a different President may have approved the act, or that the act
may have been passed over a presidential veto does not take the force from
this reasoning since the veto power belongs to the office, not the man, and since
the possibility of a presidential veto being overridden is clearly contemplated
by the Constitution."

This reasoning seems backwards. If the veto power belongs to the
office and not to the holder, then the holder cannot delegate it to
another body. If the congressional veto is contrary to Article I, section 7 of the Constitution, then whatever actions a particular President may take cannot alter that conclusion. Moreover, since
Buckley the Court has indicated in dicta that it would reject the
96. Id. at 286.
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 334 (Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).

98. 424 U.S. at 284 (White, J., concurring & dissenting).
99. Cooper & Cooper, supra note 92, at 478.
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presidential-approval argument. In National League of Cities v.
0 0 the Court rejected the dissent's contention that the states
Usery,1
were able to protect their own interests on the subject of federal
minimum-wage laws applicable to state and local employees because of the states' representation in the Senate. Noting the results
in the appointment-power aspect of Buckley and in Myers v. United
States,'' the Court declared:
In each of these cases, an even stronger argument than that made in the
dissent could be made to the effect that since each of these bills had been
signed by the President, the very officer who challenged them had consented
to their becoming law and it was therefore no concern of this Court that the
law violated the Constitution. Just as the dissent contends that 'the States are
fully able to protect their own interests

.

.

.,' it could have been contended

that the President, armed with the mandate of a national constituency and
with the veto power, was able to protect his own interests. Nonetheless, in both
because they trenched on the aucases the laws were held unconstitutional,
12
thority of the Executive Branch. 1

Whether or not the President approves legislation is thus immaterial to the constitutionality of the legislative veto. 03
There are other strong intimations that the FECA legislativeveto provision will be held unconstitutional when the question
comes before the Court. The Buckley Court recognized that the
Commission, viewed as a legislative agency because of the appointment method, could properly exercise any powers that Congress
100.

96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).

101. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Congress may not by law limit the President's authority to
remove at will an officer of the executive branch appointed by him).
102. 96 S. Ct. at 2469 n.12.
103. This is not to say that over the years Presidents have simply acquiesced in the
debilitation of executive power. To the contrary, the history of the legislative veto is a history
of executive resistance on constitutional grounds overcome by the political necessity for
particular pieces of legislation. A President without an "item" veto may find it politically
impossible to disapprove a bill which is otherwise essential but which also contains a congressional veto. The most dramatic example is the Lend-Lease Act, which contained a provision
permitting Congress to terminate it by a concurrent resolution not subject to the veto power
of the President. After Lend-Lease was passed, President Roosevelt left with the Attorney
General a memorandum embodying the President's view that the legislative veto was unconstitutional and that he had agreed to the Act only because of the existing world crisis. See
Jackson, A PresidentialLegal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (1953).
Watson, supra note 81, at 991-1029, contains a detailed history of the executivelegislative struggle over the legislative veto. Although Watson notes that the use of "extralegislative control devices has increased markedly during the first months of the Ford administration," id. at 1029, President Ford has now committed his administration to opposing the
legislative veto before the judiciary. In signing the FECA Amendments of 1976, he asserted
that the legislative veto violated the Constitution, and he directed the Attorney General to
challenge its constitutionality "at the earliest possible opportunity." 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PREs. DOCUMENTS 857, 858 (May 17, 1976). The result was the intervention by the United
States as a plaintiff in Clark v. Valeo. See note 80 supra.
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could exercise directly or through one of its committees. Nevertheless, the Court squarely held that rule-making is not such a power.
It is hard to see how the Court, having held that Congress cannot
make campaign rules through the instrument of a legislative
agency, could avoid holding that direct participation by Congress
in the rule-making process through the legislative veto is also unconstitutional.
The possibility of a congressional veto is often as effective a
deterrent to agency action as the fact of a veto. Justice White was
apparently unimpressed with the impact on agency deliberations
that the congressional veto might have:
Congressional influence over the substantive content of agency regulations

may be enhanced, but I would not view the power of either House to disapprove
as equivalent to legislation or to an order, resolution or vote requiring the
concurrence of both Houses.'0 '

Such an approach seriously underestimates the in terrorem effect of
the legislative veto. The possibility that vital regulations will be
delayed from going into effect because a provision objectionable to
a powerful Member of Congress comes to his attention must necessarily be near the forefront of any consideration of proposed rules
by agency staff and commissioners. For a court to ignore the pervasive influence exerted by the threat of veto and to focus only on
specific instances of its use, would be to concede to Congress the
ability to use the congressional veto in a virtually unlimited fashion.
The FECA's legislative-veto provisions are even more vulnerable to constitutional attack than most." 5 Regulations dealing with
campaign finance directly affect the profession and job security of
every legislator and place them in a sharp conflict of interest. Experience indicates that legislators will enact or modify legislation and
use the FEC to protect themselves to the detriment of challengers
and minor-party and independent candidates. The form of the
FECA veto explicitly recognizes Congress's self-interested purpose
by making regulations dealing only with the elections of one House
subject to veto only by that body.
Members of the Congress, of course, are candidates for office
and thus are greatly affected by the Commission's regulations. If a
primary purpose of campaign reform is to avoid even the appear104. 424 U.S. at 284-85 (White, J., concurring & dissenting).
105. This special vulnerability may in part explain the filing of Clark v. Valeo. Plaintiff
Ramsey Clark is represented by attorneys from Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation
Group, an organization that consistently has opposed the inclusion of legislative vetoes in
recent legislation.
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ance of impropriety, that end is hardly served by the constant and
detailed embroilment of the Congress in interpreting and fleshing
out the campaign restrictions under which they and their challengers operate. Implementation of the campaign law contains a host of
opportunities to favor incumbents, and repeated congressional involvement will increase public suspicion that the Act is an incumbents' protection law. Bias in favor of the majority party controlling
the Congress is equally inevitable. It would be far better to place the
rule-making process under proper safeguards in a genuinely independent and impartial agency rather than in one under incumbent
and majority-party domination."'5
The presumption of constitutionality that might otherwise inhere in a legislative-veto provision should be denied to the FECA
and Subtitle H provisions for two reasons. First, in this instance the
congressional veto operates within the ambit of the first amendment, an area in whichthe presumption of constitutionality is much
weaker than in other areas. 07 In Buckley, the Court applied the
strict standard of review normally employed in first amendment
cases rather than the weaker standard that the court of appeals had
106. The Commission was intentionally designed to be "bipartisan," that is, representative of only the hitherto successful elements of the political process. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC.
10,328 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (remarks of Representative Brademas). A politically appointed and congressionally controlled agency, like the Commission, necessarily has a bias
in favor of the two major parties when their interests coincide, and against minor parties and
independents, that is automatic and virtually unconscious.
The classic example to date is the Commission's undated "Policy Statement - Presidential Debates," holding that the League of Women Voters may pay for the debates between
the two major-party candidates for President, excluding all other candidates, without the
payment's being a contribution to the campaigns of those two candidates. Yet the payments
surely assist those candidates as against all others. The same logic would seem to require the
result that a monetary gift to one major-party candidate is not a "contribution" so long as
the donor made an equal gift to the other. But as the Chief Justice commented during oral
argument in Buckley, "a man giving $10,000 to each of the two major party candidates
perhaps just wants to make sure that one of two men that he regards as responsible will be
elected and that the third-party candidate will not be elected." Record at 50. Regardless of
the motivation of the League of Women Voters, on which the Commission's Policy Statement
heavily relied, the effect seems exactly the same. We submit that, notwithstanding the
arguments that can be made to the contrary, the League's payment must be regarded as a
contribution if unfairness to other candidates is to be avoided.
107. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, one of the preeminent opponents of the theory that the
first amendment occupied a "preferred position" among constitutional values, nonetheless
believed that "those liberties of the individual which history has attested as the indispensable
conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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adopted. The same strict standard should be applied to FEC regulations, and especially so because they are subject to legislative veto.
Secondly, the legislators' intense personal interest in the substance
of Commission regulations should cause courts to pause and consider the possible harm such a veto might inflict on our relatively
open political system. Understanding and taking into account legislative conflict of interest is nothing new to the Court. It has previously asserted that the presumption of constitutionality is based
on the assumption that the legislative structure is fairly representative; when the issue is whether that underlying assumption is valid,
the presumption of constitutionality is weakened.' An attack on
that basic assumption is involved when the FECA's legislative veto
is challenged.
The vulnerability of the legislative veto to constitutional criticism is thus considerable. Even if the veto is invalidated, 09 significant problems will remain with the FECA's enforcement scheme.
B.

Astride the PoliticalProcess

The Buckley Court clearly recognized that any regulation of
campaign expenditures and contributions operates in a critically
sensitive area of constitutional concern. The Court left no doubt
that such regulation inevitably encroaches on free speech and requires a balancing process between compelling governmental needs
and first amendment freedoms. When activity by citizens in this
most sensitive area is subjected to regulation, especially with criminal sanctions, the inhibiting effect on political expression is acute.
Moreover, the election law is both highly complex and in many
respects vague, as was fully recognized in the Senate debate on the
Commission's office-account regulations."' In these circumstances,
the power to interpret the law is largely the power to make new law.
An agency with this kind of power has vast influence over the political process, including the power to determine the results of particu108. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
109. It is likely that if Buckley had precluded retention of the legislative veto, Congress
would have dispensed with the FEC altogether. In fact, the FECA Amendments strengthened
the legislative veto by limiting the permissible scope of Commission advisory opinions and
by expanding the areas in which the FEC must issue regulations (thus subjecting more FEC
decisions to congressional approval). See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 437f, 438(c) (Supp. 3, 1976). In view
of the evidence that Congress considered the veto as of pivotal importance, the question of
severability will arise if the veto is invalidated. The Supreme Court might conclude that the
statutory provisions establishing and vesting powers in the Commission would have to be
enjoined along with the legislative-veto provisions, on the ground that Congress would not
have enacted the first without the second.
110. 121 CONG. REC. 17,873-89 (daily ed., Oct. 8, 1975).
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lar elections. The Commission has used these powers with a vengeance. The Commission's pronouncements make new law - sometimes in areas in which the statute as enacted by the Congress was
silent and sometimes in rather striking disregard of what the statute
did say."'
Familiar and long-accepted principles of constitutional law
hold that "standards of permissible vagueness are strict in the area
of free expression .

. .

. Because first amendment freedoms need

breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.""1 2 Otherwise, citizens uncertain about
what is forbidden and what is not will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone,"'1 thus forfeiting valuable rights of speech and association
in the process. The Buckley decision reemphasized the importance
of the vagueness doctrine in the first amendment area,"' construing
former 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) to eliminate its unconstitutional vagueness before invalidating the provision altogether. Since the decision
in Buckley, the resurrected FEC has promulgated new sets of proposed regulations.' Whether they sufficiently cure the ambiguities
that permeate the FECA is an open question. Those regulations,
however, convincingly demonstrate the immense discretion with
which the FEC is vested, and the complete system of prior restraints
that the FECA has established.'16
111. Among the more conspicuous law-making pronouncements issued by the preBuckley Commission in only a few months of operation were: interim guidelines to govern
special New Hampshire election, 40 Fed. Reg. 40668 (1975); eligibility of contributions for
matching grants under Subtitle H, FEC Notice 1975-40, 40 Fed. Reg. 41933 (1975); interim
guidelines to govern special Tennessee election, 40 Fed. Reg. 43660 (1975); spending limit
applicable to a candidate running for 2 federal offices simultaneously, FEC Notice 1975-44,
40 Fed. Reg. 42839 (1975); disclosure regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 44698 (1975); office-account
regulations, 121 CONG. REC. 12,873-89 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975); attorneys' or accountants' fees
as expenditures, Advisory Opinion 1975-27, 40 Fed. Reg. 51351 (1975); delegates to national
nominating conventions: rules on contributions and expenditures, Advisory Opinion 1975-12,
40 Fed. Reg. 55596 (1975); contribution to a candidate from members of his immediate family,
Advisory Opinion 1975-65, 40 Fed. Reg. 58393 (1975).
112. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
113. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). In Speiser, the Court held that taxassessment procedures which shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer are inadequate when
first amendment issues are at stake. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
114. 424 U.S. at 40-44.
115. 41 Fed. Reg. 21572 (1976). Since Congress adjourned on October 1, 1976, 2 legislative days before the Commission's rules would have been effective absent congressional disapproval, there were no regulations in effect for the 1976 elections.
116. Merely as one example, the New York Times reported that the Commission was
"deadlocked, almost hopelessly," and deferred decision on the question whether Congressman Edward I. Koch (D. - N.Y.) could issue campaign buttons reading "Carter-MondaleKoch" without making an illegal contribution to the other candidates mentioned. The Times
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It is highly inappropriate, and arguably unconstitutional, for
any agency to make law in an area so directly affecting freedom of
speech and the electoral process. When either a candidate or an
ordinary citizen is told by the Commission that certain political
activity that he wishes to undertake would violate the law, in the
overwhelming majority of cases he will refrain from engaging in that
activity although he is convinced the Commission's interpretation
is wrong. Even if he is otherwise disposed to litigate the issue, if he
is well advised by counsel he will be aware that: first, a court probably will enforce a Commission rule as having the force of law unless
it unquestionably is contrary to the words of the statute; secondly,
a court may give great weight to any Commission pronouncement,
because of alleged agency expertise, in deciding on the proper interpretation of the statute; thirdly, if the candidate or citizen is held
to have violated the law, a Commission pronouncement can be used
to strengthen the argument that the violation was knowing and
willful." 7 Thus he will be chilled from exercising what a court ultimately might hold to be his rights under both the Constitution and
the statute. He will be subjected to a prior restraint on the exercise
commented, "The process of regulating political campaigns has reached the point of ultimate
absurdity . . . . [Ilt might seem to the average layman that the free speech guarantee of
the Constitution, let alone common sense and political tradition, gives Mr. Koch the inalienable right to link his candidacy with those of Mr. Carter and Senator Mondale if he chooses."
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1976, at 39, col. 1. We agree. The Commission eventually permitted
Congressman Koch's buttons, although without giving any reasons. Letter from Chairman
Thomson to Stanley Schlesinger, Sept. 21, 1976. Its delay chilled the Congressman's speech
during a crucial part of the general-election campaign: from August 27, 1976, when Koch
made his inquiry of the Commission, until September 21.
Only very recently has the Commission fully geared up its advisory-opinion mechanism
after the period of confusion caused by Buckley and the delay in enactment of the 1976
Amendments. Now the Commission is issuing pronouncements almost daily that chill speech,
the press, and the political process. As this article goes to press, Campaign PracticesReports
announces the issuance of Advisory Opinion 1976-29, holding that when a candidate is a
stockholder, director, and officer of a newspaper, commentaries or editorials favorable to his
candidacy are presumptively illegal corporate contributions in kind. CAMPAIGN PRACTICES
REPORTS, Sept. 20, 1976, at 4. If this opinion is sustained, a tradition dating back to the
earliest days of the republic and beyond - ownership or control of news media by political
candidates and parties will have been effectively outlawed. See, e.g., F. MoTr, AMEFICAN
JouRNALISM 122-27 (1950). Nothing in first amendment history or theory provides any basis
for tolerating such a rule, and we predict it will not survive a court test. In the meantime a
newspaper will have been subjected to prior restraint for a lengthy period, which presumably
began at least as early as February 26, 1976, when the opinion was requested.
117. The Commission plainly intends to exploit these chilling effects to the utmost.
According to Campaign PracticesReports the position of "Commission lawyers" is that the
proposed rules and policy statements (1) are "admissible in evidence" in enforcement proceedings, (2) can be used to show violations were "deliberate," and (3) should be "accorded
'substantial' weight in the courts because the agency is 'presumed to have administrative
expertise in the area.'" CAMPAIGN PRACTICEs REPORTS, Oct. 4, 1976, at 2.
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of his first amendment rights. This chilling effect or prior restraint
resulting from Commission pronouncements should be held to violate the Constitution." 8 The post-Buckley reconstitution of the
Commission without any changes that address this problem leaves
a constitutional cloud over the statute and the Commission, and the
removal of the cloud necessarily will await further litigation.
One of the present authors suggested in the hearings on the 1976
Amendments that this problem could be mitigated by a provision
that Commission rules, advisory opinions, and other pronouncements could not have the force of law, create a presumption, show
criminal intent in the nature of scienter, or be used in any other
fashion in any enforcement proceeding against any person." 9 It was
suggested that only in this way could the Commission avoid the
chilling effect of prior restraint. Such a provision would protect a
citizen who disagrees with a Commission pronouncement, chooses
to act in disregard of it, and finds himself the objectof proceedings.
A person in this situation of course must take his chances that a
court will decide independently that his actions violated the statute.
Nevertheless, he should not be in effect forced to comply with whatever restrictions the Commission chooses to impose upon him because of the danger that a court will be precluded or influenced by
the position the Commission has taken. This is a particularly aggravated form of prior restraint upon speech that could not be sustained if established first amendment principles are followed.
As with impermissible vagueness, the doctrine of prior restraint
rests on familiar principles sufficiently clear to identify the FEC's
rule-making power as a prior restraint. Such a restraint, which bears
a heavy presumption against its constitutionality, 2 ' can be saved
only by "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of
a censorship system."12 Required procedural devices include:
[F]irst,the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the
material is unprotected, must rest on the censor; second, any restraint prior
118. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975);
"Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301 (1965); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958), in which the Court held that tax-assessment procedures that shift the burden of proof
to the taxpayers are not adequate when first amendment issues are at stake; Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
119. Hearings on S. 2911, S. 2912, S. 2918, S.2953, S. 2980, and S. 2987 Before the
Subcomm. on Privilegesand Elections of the Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1976). The suggested provision was introduced as an amendment
on the Senate floor but was rejected by a vote of 65 to 23. 122 CONG. REc. 3681-87 (daily ed.
March 17, 1976).
120. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
121. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
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to judicial review can be imposed only for the purpose of preserving the status
quo; third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured.'2

All these safeguards are absent under the FECA. Indeed, like the
postal statute in Lamont v. PostmasterGeneral,'23 which "sets administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise
it, write the addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail,' '1 4 the FECA puts the Commission astride the
flow of politics in America. One candidate may be audited, while
another may go virtually unnoticed; one group may seek an advisory
opinion from the Commission, waiting months for a decision, while
another more daring group will engage in precisely the same activities hoping to prevail in any ensuing confrontation with the FEC.
None of this contributes to "fairness" in the political process, nor
does it have anything to do with the central statutory purpose of the
FECA - the elimination of corruption and the appearance of corruption.
This "chilling" process is intensified by the fact that most issues and disputes will arise in the course of political campaigns,
when a right of speech postponed for a few months, weeks, or even
days may be the equivalent of a right denied altogether. Afterthoughts are of little comfort here. The result of a Commission
mistake, constitutional or otherwise, may well be that the candidate
who otherwise would have been chosen by the voters has been defeated because his speech has been stifled. That is a horrendous
result, and not one susceptible to post facto rectification. A further
in terrorem effect is created by the natural reluctance of a political
candidate to do anything that might subject him to accusations that
he is violating the election law or an FEC rule. All these are reasons,
not only why a sensitive Congress might have chosen a far more
cautious approach than the FECA, but why courts may view such
an approach as constitutionally required.
The administrative apparatus of the FECA is justified by its
proponents on essentially pragmatic grounds. They argue that the
number of decisions faced by the Commission is so great that Congress could not possibly answer all such questions in advance. The
only way to proceed, they assert, is on a case-by-case basis, attempting to eliminate confusion as time passes and experience under the
FECA grows.2 15 These practical arguments may be well founded.
122. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
123. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
124. Id. at 306.
125. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 10,910 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative Frenzel, a key advocate of the FEC). Any attempt to decipher the FECA and the
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Indeed, given the creativity and ingenuity that were once thought
to be the special genius of free political activity, there is every reason to believe that a priori formulations are almost certain to be
inadequate. Assuming these pragmatic arguments to be correct,
they do not lead to the conclusion that politics needs an FEC. On
the contrary, they lead to the conclusion that governmental regulation of political speech should be limited to fair disclosure requirements. A system that allows flexibility but keeps the voters informed is far better than one that attempts to suppress "undesirable" political activity and either is always several steps behind or
only confuses an already almost incomprehensible framework.
Supreme Court decisions that have developed the doctrine of
"excessive discretion" over first amendment freedoms vested in regulatory officials demonstrate the constitutional weakness of the
FEC's position. In Saia v. New York,1 26 the Court ruled that a municipal ordinance that vested in the local chief of police discretion
to permit the use of "sound-amplification devices" was "invalid on
its face." In holding that the use of such devices could not be made
to depend on the "whim or caprice" or "uncontrolled discretion" of
the local official,' 21 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
observed:
In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said to have found
the sound annoying. In the next one a permit may be denied because some
people find the ideas annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance
reveals its vice."2

In Kunz v. New York,'2 the Court reversed a state-court conviction
based on a New York City ordinance forbidding worship meetings
on city streets without a permit from the police commissioner. Discovering "no appropriate standards" in the ordinance to guide the
commissioner's discretion, the Court found that it constituted an
impermissible prior restraint. In addition to Saia and Kunz, earlier
cases 30 and subsequent decisions' 3' firmly establish that the discreCommission's regulations brings immediately to mind the Supreme Court's description of the
statute at issue in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967): "[v]agueness of
wording is aggravated by prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations, and administrative
machinery, and by manifold cross-references to interrelated enactments and rules."
126. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
127. Id. at 560-62.
128. Id. at 562.
129. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
130. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
131. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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tion of government officials must be carefully circumscribed in the

first amendment area.
The vitality of the excessive-discretion doctrine was recently
demonstrated in Hynes v. Mayor.3 ' A municipal ordinance of the
Borough of Oradell, New Jersey, required door-to-door canvassers to
obtain permits from the Borough Clerk and the Chief of Police.
While observing that house-to-house canvassing as a way of spreading ideas "seems the least entitled to extensive protection," the
Supreme Court nonetheless invalidated the ordinance on vagueness
grounds, stating that any ordinance designed to protect householders must be "narrowly drawn," and must not "vest in municipal
officials the undefined power to determine what messages residents
will hear. .... "13 The strict scrutiny of government discretion over
first amendment freedoms employed by the Hynes Court demonstrates the vulnerability of both the FEC and the FECA. The discretion of the municipal clerk so rigorously scrutinized in Hynes is
insignificant compared to the FEC's vast discretionary powers. Further, the Oradell municipal ordinance was a model of legislative
draftsmanship and clarity compared to numerous sections of the
FECA.
The excessive-discretion doctrine has not been applied to an
agency with the scope of the FEC's powers. In recent years, federal
regulatory agencies generally have been accorded considerable deference by the courts. Nonetheless, it would be inconsistent with the
spirit of the municipal-licensing cases not to extend their principles
to the FEC. While such an extension may result in continuing difficulty for the Commission, that result is certainly more desirable
than abandoning the judiciary's traditional solicitude for political
speech.
The imprecision of the FECA, the system of prior restraints
established by the statute's enforcement mechanism, and the discretionary power vested in the FEC all combine to create a "chilling" effect on the exercise of political activity unprecedented in
American history. Even apart from the constitutional problems
raised by many of the FECA's substantive provisions, the enforcement problem is itself virtually insuperable. There is much to be
said for Chief Justice Burger's concluding remarks in Buckley:
132.
133.

96 S. Ct. 1755 (1976).
Id. at 1759.
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There are many prices we pay for the freedom secured by the First Amendment; the risk of undue influence is one of them, confirming what we have long
known: freedom is hazardous, but some restraints are worse.'34
III.

OUTSTANDING INDEPENDENT-EXPENDITURE ISSUES

As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Buckley distinguished sharply between limitations on contributions to candidates
and expenditures made independently by citizens in support of such
candidates, holding the former constitutional but striking down the
latter. As long as limitations on contributions remain in effect, an
increasing portion of political activity by citizens may be conducted
by means of independent expenditures. This expansion should be
felt most sharply in presidential elections because all direct support
for candidates has been prohibited, and many citizens accustomed
to and desirous of such means of political expression are searching
for substitutes. The majority in Congress, like the defendants in
Buckley, regarded independent expenditures as an unfortunate and
dangerous "loophole" to a well-ordered system of campaign finance
regulation. Given this attitude, insensitive though it may seem in
the light of the Supreme Court's holding that independent expenditures are protected by fundamental first amendment rights, constant vigilance must be exercised if continuing encroachments on
those rights are to be prevented.
A.

The "Coordination"Problem

In its proposed regulations 3' 5 the Commission attempted, with
one exception required by the 1976 Amendments,'36 to define independent expenditures in accordance with the Buckley decision. The
basic definition reads:
'Independent expenditure' means an expenditure by a person for a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate which is not made with the cooperation or with the prior consent
of, or in consultation with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate or
any agent or authorized committee of such candidate.' 3'

The Commission's definitions of the terms in this section also generally are reasonable and not clearly inconsistent with the Court's
opinion.'35 Nevertheless, the Commission's approach fails to resolve
134. 424 U.S. at 256-57 (Burger, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
135. Proposed Fed. Election Reg. § 109, 41 Fed. Reg. 35,947 (1976).
136. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
137. Proposed Fed. Election Reg. § 109.1(a), 41 Fed. Reg. 35,947 (1976).
138. For example, "agent" is defined in a relatively limited fashion properly focused
on the existence vel non of actual or apparent authority to authorize the making of expendi-
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the problem of expenditures by individuals based on information
about the candidate's plans or needs provided by the candidate or
his agents.' 9 This "coordination" problem will remain as long as the
constitutional distinction between contributions and independent
expenditures stands. The possible nuances, distinctions, and differences in degree or in kind are almost limitless, and will presumably
have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
The major problem with the distinction between contributions
and expenditures is its inevitable chilling effect on political speech.
Many citizens wishing to engage in independent political activity
will be deterred by the uncertainty as to which side of the ultimately
artificial line created by the Court their planned activities fall. Such
inhibitions will be magnified by the requirement that independent
expenditures over $100 must be reported to the Commission, and
that the report must include, "under penalty of perjury, a certification of whether such independent expenditure is made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion
of, any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate."'' 0 It seems at least questionable whether government regulation of independent political activity, an activity previously regarded as healthy and which was vindicated by the Supreme Court in Buckley as a constitutional right, is a price worth
paying for campaign finance "reform" in the nature of restrictions
on campaign contributions. As experience accumulates, guiding
principles may evolve that will mitigate this dilemma. The Commission might advance this process by making its regulations more
specific and thereby eliminating the vagueness and breadth of some
of the language defining "coordination" which seems both unworkable and intimidating. The Commission ought to recognize, for example, that a candidate must be permitted to announce publicly
what his campaign strategy is, what his strengths and weaknesses
are, what media he intends to use most frequently, what issues he
intends to stress, in which geographic localities he intends to campaign most heavily, and in which he does not without impairing the
"independence" of those who use such information to target their
tures. Id. § 109.1(b)(5). "Expressly advocating" appears to be correctly defined as including
only communications using the "buzz words" required by the Supreme Court. Id. §
109.1(b)(2). It bears remembering that communications clearly favorable to one candidate
but falling short of such express advocacy are not independent expenditures at all, need not
be reported, and cannot be limited through the guise of limiting "contributions" to them as
the Commission has attempted to limit independent expenditures. See notes 146-59 infra.
139. See Proposed Fed. Election Reg. § 109.1(b)(4)(i)(A), 41 Fed. Reg. 35,947 (1976).
140. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(e)(2) (Supp. 3, 1976).
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expenditures. In effect, the candidate should have every right to
state, without the risk of enforcement action based on speculations
as to his motives, that "I have no plans to campaign in State X. I
have no plans to buy media time there. The issues I would discuss
if I were there would be A and B, which I favor, and C and D, which
I oppose."
If such an announcement were made publicly and independent
expenditures resulted, no presumption or inference of coordination
or control should be permitted. Candidates, campaign officials, and
workers routinely are interviewed by the press about their strategies, their plans, and their predictions. Buried beneath the typically
optimistic expectations, significant information often is conveyed,
information readily understandable by anyone with even a minimum knowledge of political realities. Any attempt to limit such
communications would pose grave risks of discriminatory enforcement. Moreover, the candidate himself often will have legitimate
reasons for wishing to make such announcements quite apart from
any effects they might have on independent spenders: to rally his
supporters or discourage his opponents; to show how limited his
campaign against an incumbent must be because of the limitations
on contributions; or to show that his affluent opponent is substantially outspending him. The candidate and his supporters have compelling first amendment interests at stake as well. Any attempt to
restrict the ability of candidates to enunciate their political strategies also would restrict the freedom of the press by limiting the
ability of reporters and commentators to discuss and report political
events. The Commission should recognize that such announcements
are proper even if partly motivated by a desire to encourage independent expenditures, and should not support, without more, a
finding of forbidden "coordination." Instead, the Commission has
erected a vague motive test' that threatens virtually every candidate and independent spender with accusations of unlawfulness and
can only serve to inhibit perfectly proper political speech and activity.
One of the most needless effects of the Supreme Court's
decision, and one not alleviated in the proposed regulations, has
been the widely expressed fear that casual conversation among campaign leaders for a candidate and persons engaged in making independent expenditures are now precluded, or at least so highly suspect that witnesses ought to be present whenever any such contacts
141.

See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
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occur. Among groups which share the same basic philosophical
views, some individuals will work for a particular candidate's campaign, while others may work for or with an organization supporting
the candidate and which makes independent expenditures. To
cause such people to fear to meet each other, or to threaten "coordination" findings if they talk about politics, has profound implications for the protected first amendment right of freedom of association. Accordingly, an explicit recognition by the Commission
that people may meet and discuss politics without creating any
presumption or inference of coordination or control would be highly
desirable. "2 Even if the Commission were to move in the directions
suggested,"' unacceptable governmental intrusion into constitutionally protected areas of speech and association seems inherent in
any attempt to regulate on the basis of the Court's distinction between expenditures and contributions for first amendment purposes.
Finally, in its attempt to restrict the independent-expenditure
"loophole" as narrowly as possible, Congress in the 1976 Amendments added a provision that has no warrant in the Supreme
Court's decision:
[Tihe financing by any person of the dissemination, distribution, or republication, in whole or in part, of any broadcast or any written, graphic, or other
form of campaign materials prepared by the candidate, his campaign committees or their authorized agents shall be considered

as an expenditure made in cooperation, consultation, or concert
with the candidate, and therefore a contribution to the candidate's
142. The chilling effect of vagueness and uncertainty in this area is quite real. In June
1976 the Conservative Party of the State of New York, one of the plaintiffs in Buckley v.
Valeo, held its annual convention. In the course of the activities normally associated with
such conventions, the Party hoped to sponsor a public, round-table discussion on what conservative citizens might do in the general-election campaign to support Governor Reagan
should he win the Republican Party's presidential nomination. One panelist the Party hoped
to invite was a distinguished young conservative political consultant, who, as it happens, had
engaged in a limited amount of consulting work for the Citizens for Reagan, Governor Reagan's principal campaign committee. The consultant declined to participate in the roundtable for fear of a Commission accusation of "coordination" or "control." Unfortunately,
nothing in the statute or the proposed regulations would allay his fears. Such needless dampening of fundamental civil liberties finds no justification in any legitimate policy underlying
the FECA.
143. The suggestions set forth above and others were made to the Commission, see
Testimony of John R. Bolton, June 9, 1976, without notable success except with respect to
the definition of "agent," see note 138 supra, and elimination of a draft provision that by
''ratifying" an expenditure the candidate or his agent could transform subsequent similar
expenditures into "coordinated" contributions. The regulations as adopted are silent on the
latter point.

1364

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1327

campaign.'44 The Commission has incorporated this language in its
proposed regulations.' 45 Since such "financing" obviously can occur
without any "coordination" between spender and candidate, the
provision seems plainly unconstitutional, and we predict it will fall
when challenged in court.' 6
B.

Independent Expenditures by Groups or Committees

Even more serious than the problems discussed above is the
Commission's imposition of limits on independent expenditures
made by groups of people cooperating with one another. The Commission has moved to restrict such activities by regarding the members' individual financial participation as "contributions" subject
to the FECA's contribution limits, notwithstanding the fact that
they are made not to the candidate but to a group wholly independent of the candidate which makes solely independent expenditures. If this approach is upheld, the Buckley Court's vindication of
first amendment rights in the independent-expenditure area will
have been emasculated. An early challenge to the Commission on
this point is thus the most urgent single imperative in the entire
campaign-regulation area.
The statute defines "political committee" as including any
"group of persons" that either receives contributions or makes expenditures exceeding $1,000 per year for the purpose of influencing
federal elections.'47 The Commission began its campaign to limit
independent expenditures by taking the view that a group making
only such expenditures is covered by the prohibition on contributions exceeding $5,000 "to any other political committee."' 4 The
Commission's regulations and other publications state that this
$5,000 limit and the $25,000 ceiling applicable to all contributions
by an individual in a single year are the only limits attaching to
contributions to political committees other than a candidate's authorized committee.'4 9 As of September 1976, however, the Commission has informed those making inquiries that its present policy is
144. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. 3, 1976).
145. Proposed Fed. Election Reg. § 109.1(d)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 35,947 (1976).
146. The section is so appallingly drafted that its terms include not only the situations
to which it was presumably directed, but also all media coverage of pronouncements by
candidates.
147. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(d) (Supp. 3, 1976).
148. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(C).
149. Proposed Fed. Election Reg. § 110.1(d), 41 Fed. Reg. 35,948 (1976); see FED. ELECTION COMM'N, CAMPAIGN GUm ON CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITUREs 2.13 (August 1976); FED.
ELECTION COMM'N, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR COMMITTEES 1.21 (June 1976).
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contained in an unpublished draft memorandum that limits contributions to a committee making independent expenditures on behalf
of a single candidate to $1,000 and that aggregates such contributions with contributions made to the candidate, his authorized committees, or to other independent committees on his behalf in order
to determine whether the $1,000 ceiling has been exceeded.5 0 The
Commission reaches this result by regarding such contributions as
made "on behalf of a particular candidate" within the meaning of
Section 441a7(C), a result not required by the text of that subsection
standing alone, and forbidden if read in light of the Buckley decision. 5 '
Further, the Commission has ruled that a group of individuals
that is not "organized" in any fashion, has no headquarters or bank
account, but whose members are bound together only by a common
political concern will be regarded as a political committee for
contribution-limits purposes if any one person collects and delivers
contributions of other individuals in the group.5 2 This opinion dealt
with contributions to a candidate or authorized committee. If, as
seems probable, the Commission extends the same rationale to informal groups joining to make independent expenditures, it will
have completed the process of restricting the constitutional right to
make such expenditures to a single individual acting in complete
isolation. For example, individuals contributing to a single advertisement which qualified as an independent expenditure would by
that act become a political committee, subject to the Act's reporting
requirements and contribution limits.
The Commission reasons that what it has done is not inconsistent with Buckley:
The focus of the Court was on the constitutional right to 'vigorous advocacy'
by an individual or organization; however, this right did not include donations
to another person or organization to communicate for the original 'speaker.'
Under Buckley, the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, and the Commission's proposed regulations, Part 109, a person or
150. Fed. Election Comm'n Memorandum No. 745 (Aug. 3, 1976). As this article goes
to press the Commission has finally made its latest position public. Fed. Election Comm'n
Policy Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 44,130 (1976).
151. The Commission's interpretation is supported by the legislative history of the 1976
Amendments. H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1976). In that Report Congress
explicitly invited the Commission to restrict independent-expenditure contributions notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision.
152. Fed. Election Comm'n Advisory Opinion No. 1976-51 (Sept. 2, 1976) (unpublished). It has been reported that the Commission's General Counsel strongly objected to this
opinion, regarding it as putting "a further crimp on the constitutional right of association."
CAMPAIGN PAcrICES REPORTS, Sept. 6, 1976, at 2.
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organization is subject to no limitation on 'independent expenditures' made
for or against Federal candidates. The right to 'speak one's mind' is thus
unimpaired. However, when the speaker chooses to contribute to another person or organization, the Court's rationale for upholding contribution limits
comes into play, and the Act's limits would apply to this activity.'

This rationale is wholly inconsistent with the Buckley decision,
which clearly indicated that "contributions" may be constitutionally restricted only when made to candidates for federal office or
their authorized campaign committees. Holding that the Act's purpose "to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions"'54 was the only basis
on which to sustain the contribution limits, the Court recognized
that the rationale applies only to contributions to candidates for
federal office, to their authorized committees, and arguably to political parties. The Court rejected the notion that unlimited independent expenditures would have a corrupting effect:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."-,

Further, the Buckley Court's rejection of the need to reduce the
"skyrocketing" costs of election campaigns and the need to "equalize" the speech of affluent and non-affluent persons' 6 as compelling
governmental interests clearly demonstrates that in upholding contribution limits, the Court sustained such limits only with respect
to contributions "to [c]andidates and [a]uthorized [c]ampaign
[c]ommittees. ' ' 57 Nothing in the opinion furnishes a rationale for
limitations on contributions to independent groups or committees.
To the contrary, such contributions fall squarely within the type of
activity that the Court held was protected by the first amendment
from any regulation beyond disclosure requirements.
The Commission's theory that independent expenditures are
constitutionally inviolate only when they represent "personal"
speech or activity by the donor, and hence that contributions to
independent-expenditure committees are unprotected, finds no support in Buckley.' 8 In striking down limits on independent expendi153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Fed. Election Comm'n Memorandum No. 745, at 5-6 (Aug. 3, 1976).
424 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 23; see, e.g., id. at 24, 28, 29, 34 n.40, 37.
This theory was urged by the Buckley intervening defendants in the court of
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tures, the Court deemed that theory unworthy of comment. One
might argue equally well that a political oration has no first amendment protection if it is ghost written, or that the Court's voiding of
expenditure limits on candidates applies only to money spent to
disseminate compositions that can be proved to have been written
by the candidate personally.
What such theories ignore is the first amendment right to freedom of association.'55 Political power lies in cooperative activity; if
that activity can be prohibited or limited, scrupulous preservation
of freedom of speech to individuals acting in isolation would be
meaningless. No case law or respectable theory supports limiting
first amendment freedoms to instances in which one individual has
composed, paid for, and published a text without any cooperation
with others. Such a shriveled first amendment hardly could protect
thoroughly cooperative, indeed corporate, activities such as publication of a newspaper.
In short, the Commission's attempt to stifle independent expenditures by limiting individual financial participation is squarely
contrary to the Buckley decision and the first amendment. It seems
highly probable that the Commission's restriction on independent
expenditures will not survive its first court test. The Commission's
ability to impose a patently unconstitutional restriction on an entire
presidential campaign is eloquent testimony to the chilling effect of
its powers and to the extreme perils involved in governmental intrusion into the political process under the banner of "reform."
IV.

MAY CORPORATIONS AND LABOR UNIONS MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS,

INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES, OR INDEPENDENT NON-EXPENDITURES?

Constitutional principles governing campaign finance regulation arise in a special conceptual and historical context when the
activities of corporations and labor unions are involved. While these
issues were not presented in Buckley, they undoubtedly will be affected by that decision when they arise in future litigation.
appeals. Brief for Intervening Defendants at 123, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Oral Argument for Intervening Defendants (delivered by Mr. Cutler on June 13, 1975)
at 63, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The intervening defendants abandoned
this argument in the Supreme Court, but amici curiae Senators advanced the theory there.
Brief for Senators Scott and Kennedy as Amici Curiae at 59, 60, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1(1975).
159. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); American Party v. White, 415
U.S. 767 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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Introduction

6 0 defendant labor union was charged
In United States v. CIO,1
with violating the predecessor statute to 2 U.S.C. § 441b,111 prohibiting any corporation or labor union from making contributions or
expenditures in connection with federal elections. To test the statute's constitutionality, the CIO's president had written an editorial
in the CIO newspaper (owned, published, and funded by the CIO)
endorsing a candidate for Congress in a special election held in
Maryland's Third Congressional District. The newspaper was circulated in the Third District, as were 1,000 reprints of the newspaper
that the CIO president had ordered to be specially printed.
The district court dismissed the indictment, holding that the
statute violated the first amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed
the dismissal, but on the ground that the actions alleged were not
proscribed by the statute. The Court did not read the indictment
as charging that the CIO newspaper was circulated free to nonsubscribers or nonmembers, and therefore faced only the question of a
2
union's communications with its own members.1
The prohibition against corporate contributions to political
candidates had been first enacted in 1907183 and was reenacted in
the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.164 The same prohibition was extended to labor unions temporarily by the War Labor Disputes Act
of 1943 and permanently by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The Court
explained that

[wihen Congress began to consider the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 it had as a guide the 1944 presidential election, an election which had
been conducted under the above amendment to the Act of 1925. In analyzing
the experience of that election, a serious defect was found in the wording of
the Act of 1925. The difficulty was that the word 'contribution' was read
narrowly by various special congressional committees investigating the 1944
and 1946 campaigns. The concept of 'contribution' was thought to be confined
to direct gifts or direct payments. Since it was obvious that the statute as
construed could easily be circumvented through indirect contributions, § 304
[of the Taft-Hartley Act] extended the prohibition . . . to 'expenditures.""

The majority concluded from the legislative history that Congress
did not intend to include within the coverage of the section as an
160. 335 U.S. 106, aff'g 77 F.Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1948).
161. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1074 (repealed 1976) (18 U.S.C. § 610
(1920) prior to the FECA Amendments of 1976).
162. 335 U.S. at 111.
163. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
164. Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1074.
165. 335 U.S. at 115.
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expenditure the cost of a publication circulated to members only. 6 '
Neither the Court's opinion nor the legislative history cited indicates whether the "expenditures" prohibited by the statute included those of the type we now call "independent."
The decision in United States v. UA W,'67 however, did examine
that issue. In UA W, the indictment charged that the union had paid
funds from its treasury to an advertisement agency for certain television commercials endorsing various candidates in the 1954 congressional primary and general elections. No allegations were made
regarding coordination with or control by the candidates endorsed
by the advertisements. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, the district court held that the purchase of the
television advertisements were not "expenditures" prohibited by
the statute."" On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial.
The Court again reviewed the legislative history, and concluded
that
it was to embrace precisely the kind of indirect contribution alleged in the
indictment that Congress amended § 313 to proscribe 'expenditures."' 9

During congressional investigation of their political activities, the
labor unions had argued that many of the activities complained
about were not "contributions." Specifically, in response to a charge
from Senator Taft that the Ohio CIO had printed and distributed
166. Id. at 116.
167. 352 U.S. 567 (1957), rev'g 138 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
168. In support of its holding, the district court stressed that the case before it was "on
all fours" with United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949), in which a
unanimous court of appeals panel reversed a conviction for violating what is now 2 U.S.C. §
441b (Supp. 3, 1976). The union had purchased, with funds from its general treasury, newspaper and radio advertisements advocating the rejection of Senator Taft as a candidate for the
1948 Republican presidential nomination. Judge Augustus N. Hand, while recognizing that
the majority opinion in United States v. CIO dealt with a union newspaper distributed to
members, whereas the present case concerned "ordinary" newspaper advertisements, nevertheless stated that:
[Tihe expenditure cannot be regarded as prohibited by the statute. Even if the contention that the financial or group power exercised over elections through labor unions may
be curbed, either by limiting the amount of their expenditures or by prohibiting them
altogether, be thought reasonable, an interpretation of the statute which would allow
such expenditures in the case of a union publication and prohibit them when made by
a union through the use of an independent newspaper or radio station seems without
logical justification; nor is such a differentiation suggested by the apparent purposes or
by the terms of the statute or by its legislative history.
172 F.2d at 856. In UA W, the district court noted that although the Second Circuit's decision
gave the government "a case made to order for appeal. . . no petition for certiorari was filed
." 138 F. Supp. at 57.
169. 352 U.S. at 585.
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200,000 leaflets in Ohio criticizing him and endorsing his opponent,
the CIO had replied that such activity was not a contribution, but
merely an 'expenditure of its own funds to state its position to the world
exercising its right of free speech . . . .0

The Court interpreted the legislative response as follows:
Because such conduct was claimed to be merely 'an expenditure[by the
union] of its own funds to state its position to the world,' the Senate and
House Committees recommended and Congress enacted, as we have seen, the
prohibition of 'expenditures' as well as 'contributions' to 'plug the existing
loophole."'"

In further support of its holding, the Court quoted extensively from
the 1945 Report of the House Special Committee to Investigate
Campaign Expenditures. The House Special Committee had recommended that the prohibition of contributions by unions and corporations
be clarified so as to specifically provide that expenditures of money for salaries
to organizers, purchase of radio time, and other expenditures by the prohibited
organizations in connection with elections, constitute violations of the provisions of said section, whether or not said7 expenditures
are with or without the
2
knowledge or consent of the candidates.'

The Supreme Court noted the similarity between the activity about
which Senator Taft complained and the activity described in the
indictment against the Auto Workers, and held that the Government should have the opportunity to prove at trial that an indictable offense had been committed. As in the CIO case, the Court
declined to pass on the constitutional arguments advanced. On remand, the union was acquitted by a jury. 7 3
In 1971, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 610 as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act. The language in the fourth paragraph
of section 610 beginning "As used in this section, the phrase 'contribution or expenditure' shall include . . . ." (now section
441b(b) (2)) was added through a floor amendment to the House bill
offered by Representative Hansen. In presenting his amendment, he
stated:
170. Id. at 580, quoting S. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1946).
171. 352 U.S. at 585.
172. Id. at 582, quoting H.R. REP. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1945) (emphasis
added).
173. Lane, Analysis of the Federal Law Governing Political Expenditures by Labor
Unions, 9 LAB. L.J. 725, 732 (1958).
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the purpose of my amendment is to codify the court decisions interpreting
[Section 6101 . . . and to spell out in more detail what a labor union or
corporation can or cannot do in connection with a Federal election"

Representative Hansen then explained what the first part of his
amendment would do:
The effect of this language is to carry out the basic intent of section 610,
which is to prohibit the use of union or corporate funds for active electioneering
directed at the general public on behalf of a candidate in a Federal election . ..
Next, the amendment, in further defining the phrase 'contribution or
expenditure,' draws a distinction between activities directed at the general
public, which are prohibited, and communications by a corporation to its
stockholders and their families, and by a labor organization to its members
and their families on any subject, which the courts have held is permitted.1 5

Yet again, Representative Hansen commented that:
section 610 as it stands, and under my proposal, represents a complete victory
for those who believe that corporations and unions have no moral right to
utilize their organizations' general funds for active public partisan politicking.
It totally subordinates organizational interests to individual interests. 7 6

It thus seems evident that former section 610, now 2 U.S.C. §
441b,'11 is intended to cover and does in fact cover "independent"
expenditures by corporations and unions as well as contributions by
them. Three questions, however, immediately are raised by this
conclusion. Is section 441b itself constitutional? What is the effect
of Buckley v. Valeo on section 441b? Are corporations and labor
unions now or were they ever barred from making "independent
non-expenditures," that is, expenditures that do not explicitly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for
federal office?
B.

The Constitutionality of Section 441b

After almost seventy years of its existence in one form or another, the constitutionality of section 441b is still unknown. The
Supreme Court has avoided answering the issue just as assiduously
in the more recent cases of PipefittersLocal 562 v. United States'78
174. 117 CONG. REc. 43,379 (1971).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 43,380.
177. The scope and practical effect of the "segregated fund" and "communications to
members" provisions of § 441b, as revised by the FECA Amendments of 1976, as well as the
constitutionality of the distinctions made by those amendments between what corporations
and labor unions may do are beyond the scope of this article.
178. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
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and Cort v. Ash'7 as it did in the earlier CIO and UA W cases.
Although limitations on contributions were upheld in Buckley,
the Supreme Court was not faced with the issue of prohibitions on
contributions. It noted that
[wihile the contribution limitation provisions might well have been structured to take account of the graduated expenditure limitations for House,
Senate and Presidential campaigns, Congress's failure to engage in such fine
tuning does not invalidate the legislation. 8

The Court, however, stressed that while it would not decide whether
a $2,000 ceiling was better than a $1,000 ceiling, it avoided such
considerations because
[sluch distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said
to amount to differences in kind.'08

Thus, when faced with a complete prohibition on contributions, the
Court may well decide differently from the result in Buckley.
The issue lurking behind any discussion of section 441b's constitutionality is whether and to what extent corporations and labor
unions have first amendment rights.18 The extent to which first
amendment protection is available seems to be the more important
aspect of the issue: even if corporations and unions have some first
amendment rights, that alone is insufficient to determine whether
the protections afforded are sufficient to invalidate section 441b.
Whether or not section 441b is found invalid, resolution of the extent
to which corporations and unions fall within the protections of freedom of speech and association will be significant in determining the
impact of Buckley v. Valeo and answering the question whether
corporations and unions may make independent non-expenditures.
It seems clear that communications by unions and corporations
"internally" (to members and stockholders) and to at least some
"outsiders" are protected. The majority opinion in CIO warned
that:
[ilf § 313 [now section 441b] were construed to prohibit the publication by
corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of
periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or
advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to
office of men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our
minds as to its constitutionality."
179. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
180. 424 U.S. at 30.
181.

Id.

182.

See Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporateand Union

Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148 (1974).

183. 335 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).
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Although the Court spoke of "periodicals" advising customers on
issues important to them, it is difficult to imagine how many large
corporations could even identify their customers, let alone maintain
a periodical distribution list. Moreover, no principled constitutional
requirement appears to mandate communication on a "periodic"
rather than an ad hoc basis. In United States v. Painters Local
481,'"4 the union that had bought the television and newspaper advertisements was small and had no union newspaper of its own.
Although differences in magnitude obviously exist between the
small union and the large corporation, the Second Circuit's logic in
analogizing the CIO case to the facts before it in PaintersLocal 481
applies in both instances:
In a practical sense the situations are very similar, for in the case at bar this
small union owned no newspaper and a publication in the daily press or by

radio was as natural a way of communicating its views to its members as by a
newspaper of its own. '

The concurring opinion in CIO was much more assertive on
behalf of corporations' and unions' first amendment rights. Justice
Rutledge wrote that "[tihe expression of bloc sentiment is and
always has been an integral part of our democratic electoral and
legislative processes."""6 Further,
[tlo say that labor unions as such have nothing of value to contribute to that
process and no vital or legitimate interest in it is to ignore the obvious facts of
political and economic life and of their increasing interrelationship in modem
society .... This ostrichlike conception, if enforced by law, would deny those
values both to unions and thus to that extent to their members, as also to the
voting public in general."'

Moreover, citing Grosjean v. American Press Co.,'
ledge argued that

Justice Rut-

[clorporations have been held within the First Amendment's protection
against restrictions upon the circulation of their media of expression ....
It
184. 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
185. 172 F.2d at 856 (emphasis added).
186. 335 U.S. at 143 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 144.
188. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). In Grosjean the plaintiffs challenged a Louisiana statute that
imposed a tax on all newspapers within the state having a circulation greater than 20,000
copies per week. First amendment safeguards were held to be incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment and made applicable to the states, and the Court reaffirmed its cases holding a
corporation to be a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal protection
clauses. Id. at 244. Although the statute was deemed by the Court to be an infringement of
freedom of the press, it did state more broadly that the issues raised by the tax go
to the heart of the natural right of the members of an organized society, united for their
common good, to impart and acquire information about their common interests.
Id. at 243.

1374

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1327

cannot therefore be taken, merely upon legislative assumption, practice or
judgment, that restrictions upon freedoms of expression by corporations are
valid. Again, those matters cannot be settled finally until this Court has spoken. "

Moreover, the concurring opinion in CIO was emphatic in rejecting the majority's attempt to distinguish between "periodic"
newsletters and all other frequencies and types of distribution:
I know of nothing in the [First] Amendment's policy or history which turns
or permits turning the application of its protections upon the difference between regular and merely casual or occasional distributions. Indeed pamphleteering was a common mode of exercising freedom of the press before and at
the time of the Amendment's adoption. It cannot have been intended to tolerate exclusion of this form of exercising that freedom."'

This contention is consistent with the line of cases which has held
that "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion" is part of the press itself.191
Finally,
the difference between distribution to dues-paying members only and distribution to outsiders or the public, whether with or without price, [does not] make
a constitutional difference. The Amendment did not make its protections turn
on whether the hearer or reader pays or can pay, for the publication or the
privilege of hearing the oral or written pronouncement. Neither freedom of
right of peaceable assembly is restricted to perspeech and the press nor the
2
sons who can and do pay."1

The issues that divided the two opinions in CIO, on the basis of
which the concurring opinion would have invalidated the predecessor to section 441b as violative of the first amendment, still have not
been resolved. 9 '
189. 335 U.S. at 154-55.
190. Id. at 155.
191. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704
(1972); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). Paid "editorial" advertisements (typified recently by the Mobil Oil Company series appearing on "op-ed" pages of newspapers)
that "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, and protested
claimed abuses," see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266, clearly were entitled
to first amendment protection. A contrary rule
would discourage newspapers from carrying editorial advertisements of this type, and
so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by
persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities - who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the press.
Id.
192. 335 U.S. at 155.
193. In his dissenting opinion in UA W Mr. Justice Douglas answered these questions
in characteristic fashion:
Some may think that one group or another should not express its views in an election
because it is too powerful, because it advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a
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Numerous cases dealing explicitly with the rights afforded
labor unions by the first amendment have protected union and organizational activity, discussion of labor disputes,'94 and the associational rights of union members."' Such issues have arisen far less
frequently with respect to corporations. Unless there is something
inherent in the corporate form that disqualifies it from first amendment protection, there is no reason why corporations should not
receive the same protection as other voluntary associations. The
four attributes most often mentioned as key to the corporate form
- continuity of life, limited liability, free transferability of interests, and centralization of management - have nothing to do with
the coverage of constitutional safeguards. Since most newspapers
and other communications media whose first amendment rights
have been upheld' are corporations, the corporate form alone cannot be disqualifying for first amendment purposes. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to draw any principled distinction between
"media" corporations and others whose principal business is not
communication but which surely have political interests to protect
by communication and persuasion. Pending a dispositive opinion by
the Supreme Court, corporations can and should take the position
that their first amendment rights are coextensive with the outer
limits of protection afforded by that provision.
In addition, corporations have fifth amendment rights that may
be infringed by section 441b. That section's prohibition of union and
corporate activity seems similar to the ordinance prohibiting all
picketing near schools except labor picketing in Police Department
v. Mosley,'9 7 which was invalidated as an illegitimate categorization
by subject matter. An analogous argument might be made against
section 441b. Moreover, section 441b arguably violates the due process clause by regulating only unions and corporations among all
forms of economic organization.'
record of lawless action. But these are not justifications for withholding First Amendment rights from any group - labor or corporate. . . . First Amendment rights are part
of the heritage of all persons and groups in this country. They are not to be dispensed
or withheld merely because we or the Congress thinks the person or group is worthy or
unworthy.
352 U.S. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
194. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 102-03 (1940).
195. Transportation Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State
Bar, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
196. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
197. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
198. See Comment, supra note 182, at 163-65.
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The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo on Section 441b

Assuming that section 441b prohibits "independent expenditures," does the Buckley decision, in invalidating 18 U.S.C. §
608(e), presage a similar invalidation of section 441b? The legislative history of section 441b and predecessor statutes reveals that the
term "contribution" was deemed insufficient to prevent the flow of
union and corporate money into the political process, and that the
broader term "expenditure" was added to the statutory prohibition
as a "loophole-closing" device.' 99 Under the rationale of Buckley,
even if it is permissible to prohibit corporate and union contributions, this alone does not justify the broader proscription entailed
by the word "expenditure." As the Court said with respect to section
608(e):
The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by § 608(e)(1) thus
cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of § 608(e)(1) turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in
to limitations on core First
its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable
20
Amendment rights of political expression.

The prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption
was found insufficient as a rationale to justify section 608(e). Moreover, one attempted justification of section 441b-the prevention
of large aggregations of wealth from distorting the political process
-was also found insufficient to validate section 608(e):
But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment . . . . The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend
on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion. Cf. Eastern R.
Conf. v. Noerr Motors [sic], 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).2'

To make the point even more flatly, the Court stated:
[L]egislative restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political
'
candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment."

One final justification for section 441b - the protection of the
interests of minority shareholders and union members - was not
involved in Buckley. Nonetheless, the protection of minority interests in many instances may be an insufficient governmental interest
199.
200.
201.
202.

See notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
424 U.S. at 44-45.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 50.
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to support an interpretation of section 441b that would bar independent expenditures. The Court itself has intimated that, absent any
identifiable dissenting interest, section 441b might be a nullity.
Thus, in Pipefitters, the Court agreed that
an indictment that alleges a contribution or expenditure from the general
treasury of a union or a corporation in connection with a federal election states
an offense.'0

The Court then noted (without any prior statutory, legislative, or
judicial support) that "[t]he unanimous vote of the union members or stockholders may at most (but we need not now decide) be
a defense." ' 4
More recently, in Cort v. Ash,105 the Court found that "the
legislative history of the 1907 Act, recited at length in . . . UA W
S. . , demonstrates that the protection of ordinary stockholders was
at best a secondary concern." ' The Court also noted that "while a
stockholder acquires his stock voluntarily and is free to dispose of
it, union membership and the payment of union dues is often involuntary because of union security and check-off provisions," ' ' and
admitted that it was "arguable that the federal interest in the relationship between members and their unions is much greater than
the parallel interest in the relationship between stockholders and
state-created corporations." ' 8 The Court's recognition of the voluntary nature of stock ownership would appear to be a complete answer to any "minority interest" defense of section 441b insofar as
its prohibition on corporations is concerned.
While the coerced-membership problem often does exist with
unions, strong arguments can be made that minority interests can
be protected by measures less drastic than the complete prohibition
of union independent expenditures. The early CIO and UA W cases
were decided before the "least drastic means" line of cases developed.
In InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street,"°' the
Court held that members forced to join unions by federally authorized union-shop contracts had a first amendment right to prevent
money extracted from them from being expended to support politi203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

407 U.S. at 416 n.28.
Id.
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Id. at 81.
Id. at n.13.
Id.
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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cal causes with which they disagreed. Their remedy, as limited by
the Court, would be refunds or a reduction in the expenditure proportionate to the number of dissenting members. 21 0 In view of Street,
it seems likely that the Court would agree that section 441b is not
the least drastic means available to protect minority interests. Cort
and Street, however, make it clear that some protection of minority
rights constitutionally is required when coerced membership has
been authorized by the government. Since mandatory membership
is the case with many labor unions but not with shareholders in
corporations, it follows that greater restraints on labor union political activity than on similar activity by corporations are not only
21
justifiable but may be constitutionally required. '
D.

Corporateand Union Independent Non-expenditures

It would appear that corporations and labor unions have a
constitutionally protected right to make "independent nonexpenditures," subject to the requirement that minority rights be
protected in coercive situations, such as involuntary union membership. 2 2 The legislative history of section 441b is filled with statements by Representatives and Senators that particular language
does or does not regulate or control "non-partisan" expenditures,
"political" expenditures, "politicking," and the like.213 These statements arguably express a congressional intent that section 441b
cover expenditures that clearly are designed and intended to affect
the outcome of an election, but that do not use the specific words
set forth in Buckley.2 14 Nonetheless, congressional intent is insufficient to bring communications that are constitutionally protected
within section 441b's coverage.
The right of corporations to engage in activities designed to
affect the course of legislation has long been recognized, even in the
face of statutes such as the antitrust laws. In Eastern Railroad
210. Id. at 774-75. In so limiting the remedies, the Court used language strongly supporting the basic proposition that unions (and corporations) have a first amendment right to
"the expression of political ideas." Id. at 773.
211. Section 441b discriminates in the opposite direction. See note 74 supra.
212. "Independent non-expenditures" are defined at text accompanying note 32 supra.
Street makes it clear that protection of minority rights is required whenever "political causes"
are involved, whether or not in relation to specific election candidacies. 367 U.S. at 750, 769.
213. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. 3781 (daily ed. May 3, 1976) (remarks of Representative
Frenzel).
214. The Court noted that its construction of § 609(e)(1) restricts its application "to
communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,'
'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.'"
424 U.S. 44 n.52.
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PresidentsConference v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc. ,21 an association
of railroads was charged with a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The railroads had conducted a publicity campaign
described by the plaintiffs as "vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent,"
and "designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws and law
enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business ....
Rejecting the claim that such activities violated the Sherman Act,
the Court stated:
It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope
that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to
their competitors .... [To] disqualify people from taking a public position

in matters in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the
government of a valuable source of information and... deprive the people of
their right to petition in the
211 very instances in which that right may be of the
most importance to them.

Any other holding or construction of the Sherman Act
would raise important constitutional questions ....

[W]e think it clear that

the Sherman Act does not apply to the activities of the railroads at least insofar
as those activities comprised mere solicitations21of governmental action with
respect to the passage and enforcement of laws. '

Admittedly, Noerr is not directly on point, but it does indicate
a certain solicitude for corporate expenditures that are at least arguably "political" or that might have partisan connotations.
Whatever the effect of Noerr, the issue of corporate independent non-expenditures seems to have been settled by Buckley. Only
if the Court is willing to state flatly that a different rule applies to
corporations and unions can Buckley not be read to allow unlimited
non-expenditures subject always in the case of unions to the requirement that minority rights be protected in coercive situations.
The Buckley opinion was frank in recognizing that
the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of
election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application.
Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied
to public issues involv21
ing legislative proposals and governmental actions. "

Nonetheless, the constitutional deficiencies in section 608(e) could
only be avoided
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Id.at 129.
Id.at 139.
Id.at 138.
424 U.S. at 42.
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by reading § 608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include explicit
words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate . . .. ,

Any other construction would render the section unconstitutional.
Given this highly restrictive interpretation of the reach of section
608(e), it must be inferred that similar statutory wording (e.g., the
"in connection with" formula used in section 441b) would also be
subject to the same restrictive definition in order to avoid vagueness
problems.
Support for the idea that the Court will interpret broad phrases
narrowly to save them from invalidation is also found in the
approval with which the Court cited two lower court decisions
construing the phrase "for the purpose of influencing an election."',
In those cases, 22 to conform with first amendment requirements, the
courts had construed the phrase "made for the purpose of influencing" to include "only those expenditures 'made with the authorization or consent, express or implied, or under the control, direct or
indirect, of a candidate or his agents.' ",223 Since the corporate expenditures under discussion are independent of the candidates, they
should not be deemed to be "made for the purpose of influencing"
a federal election. 224 The section 441b formula-"in connection with
any election"-is no more specific and must be similarly construed
25
to avoid constitutional infirmity.
220. Id. at 43.
221. Id. at 23 n.24.
222. United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972);
ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated as moot sub noma. Staats v.
ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
223. 366 F. Supp. at 1057, quoting National Committee for Impeachment, 469 F.2d
1135, 1141 (2d Cir. 1972).
224. It may not be necessary to define the extent of corporate first amendment rights
for vagueness-argument purposes. A statute trenching on first amendment interests can be
invalidated for vagueness without defining the parameters of those interests or reaching more
traditional questions (e.g., whether a statute is overbroad or not rationally related to its
declared intentions). See Hynes v. Mayor, 96 S. Ct. 1755 (1976). Since corporations unquestionably have some rights under the first amendment, the Buckley vagueness argument is
fully applicable to corporate independent non-expenditures.
225. Incredibly, in our view, a Commission staff member has recently given an opinion
that a corporate federation of trade associations may not disseminate to members of the
public compilations of voting records of Congressmen on issues of interest to the business
community, also indicating its opinion of each vote as "right" or "wrong," without violating
§ 441b. Letter of N. Bradley Litchfield, Assistant General Counsel, FEC, to Stanley T.
Kaleczyc, Jr., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, O/R # 740, Oct. 12, 1976. The opinion is of course
flatly incompatible with ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated as moot
sub nom. Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975), which similarly involved dissemination
of voting records and opinions thereon by a corporation, and with Buckley unless corporations
have no First Amendment rights whatever. We predict with confidence approaching certainty
that the opinion, if adhered to by the Commission, will not survive its first court test. Yet
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CONCLUSION

By the time this article appears in print the first election campaign subject to a full legislative scheme of campaign finance regulation will be over. Statistics will be compiled and analyzed by the
commentators, with particular attention to the practical impact of
the FECA on the political process. Those statistics and analyses, as
well as the FEC's performance during the campaign, doubtless will
be used to support many further challenges to aspects of the law not
held facially invalid in Buckley. As has been indicated, we expect a
plethora of litigation along these and other lines.
The most striking impact of the law in 1976 doubtless will be
found in a sharp decrease in presidential-campaign spending activity by the major-party candidates, attributable to the expenditure
limits to which those candidates "voluntarily" acquiesced when
they accepted federal subsidies. Constitutional questions aside, we
see no advantage to the American people or political system in such
a decline of campaign speech, and we perceive very real disadvantages. Surely a successful democracy needs an informed electorate
and a thorough canvassing of election issues. While such ideals
hardly have been met to perfection in the past, their effectuation
can only be made even more improbable by the imposition of limits
on campaign speech. If, as is expected, voter participation in the
election reaches a record low in 1976, we think the decline in campaign activity compelled by the expenditure limits will have been a
significant, though certainly not the only, cause of that dubious
achievement.
Thus in our view Congress would act constructively if it eliminated expenditure limits for subsidy-taking candidates if that result
is not obtained by further litigation. If subsidies are to remain with
us, they should be used, as they are in Europe, as a floor to ensure
minimally adequate campaign funding, " ' not as a device for imposing limits that restrict political speech. Moreover, ample opportunities exist for a subsidy system much fairer than the present version,
which gives pre-election subsidies only to parties obtaining five per
cent of the vote in the preceding election. The law readily could be
revised to allow new and smaller parties to qualify for subsidies by
a petition method in line with what the Court has required in the
meanwhile its chilling effect is devastating: the recipient of the opinion has felt itself compelled to decline dissemination of the voting rating to more than 1,000 persons who requested
copies.
226. See Agree, PublicFinance After the Supreme Court Decision, 425 ANNALS 134, 13536 (1976).
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ballot-access cases. Given the natural preference for "bipartisanship" on the part of incumbent officials, such a reform seems unlikely unless the Court requires it.
Notwithstanding contribution limits, total contributions and
expenditures in the 1976 congressional elections will probably be
higher than ever before, largely because the prohibition of all contributions to major-party presidential general-election candidates artificially has channeled many resources into congressional campaigns. Experience should demonstrate that contribution limits
have the effect of excluding certain candidates and types of candidates by denying them the "seed money" necessary to mount a
viable political challenge. We remain unconvinced that any compelling governmental need warrants such consequences or the concomitant interference with private choice and free expression. Disclosure
is the correct and adequate remedy in a democratic society for alleged corruption by means of campaign contributions. If a candidate
wishes to accept a million dollars from the Mafia, the most basic
libertarian principles suggest that no impediment should or need be
placed on him from doing so, so long as the voters fully and timely
are informed. The Court has rejected that view, however, and the
Congress seems unlikely to embrace it in the foreseeable future. On
the other hand, Congress may come under a good deal of pressure,
not least from among its own Members, to increase the present
draconian contribution limits. A consensus seems to be developing
among informed people that they are unnecessarily low for any legitimate corruption-avoidance purpose, and so low that they seriously
handicap political fund raising as well as inhibiting desirable citizen
participation in politics.
Finally, we expect that this year's elections will be seen as
providing a multitude of intolerable examples of the chilling effect
and prior restraint on political speech that necessarily result from
the broad discretionary powers vested in the Federal Election Commission and from the in terrorem impact of its pronouncements,
including those later (but too late) demonstrated to have been
wrong. The Commission's most notorious contribution to the 1976
election has been the crippling of independent expenditures by its
wholly unconstitutional restrictions. Its inhibiting role has extended
into every other phase of campaign activity as well, leaving candidates and citizens alike in a state of catatonic caution completely
inconsistent with a free climate of political communication. Unless
steps are taken by Congress or the courts to relieve these horrendous
effects of the present legislation, activity both by candidates and by
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ordinary citizens and groups will remain subject to a nightmarish
straitjacket incompatible with the vigorous political life the country
has known.

